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ETHICAL AND AGGRESSIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY: THE
"ETHICAL" ISSUE OF ISSUE SELECTION
J. THOMAS SULLIVAN'
INTRODUCTION
Briefs should be brief.1
The persistent,2 and perhaps overstated, message of judges,3 clerks,
experienced appellate lawyers, and law professors is that the secret to
effectiveness on appeal is producing a tightly-drafted, narrowly-focused
appellate brief that will not distract the reader with extraneous matters
and multiple issues not meriting relief.5 As former United States Su-
preme Court Justice Robert Jackson candidly admitted:
The mind of an appellate judge is habitually receptive to the sugges-
tion that a lower court committed an error. But receptiveness declines
t Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law; Editor, The
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process. This article is based on a presentation at the third annual
Eighth Circuit Appellate Practice Institute sponsored by The Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process at the UALR School of Law, May 2, 2002. The article has been revised and expanded to
include references to federal and state law more geographically reflecting the readership of the
Denver University Law Review.
1. See People v. Galimanis, 728 P.2d 761, 762 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986). The court observed:
"A cardinal rule governing an attorney in the preparation of an appellate brief is that the document
be as named-brief!" Galimanis, 728 P.2d at 762. *
2. The Ninth Circuit has cautioned: "Leave to file a fat brief 'will be granted only upon a
showing of diligence and substantial need."' United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 285 F.3d 807, 808
(9th Cir. 2002) (citing 9TH CIR. R. 32-2).
3. "Appellate judges repeatedly complain, with justification, that many briefs they must read
are prolix or incoherent." STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.31, cmt. (1977).
Webster's defines "prolix" as "wordy or long-winded." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DicTIONARY 1814 (3d ed. 1986). In Molina-Tarazon, the Ninth Circuit observed:
The United States seeks leave to file a Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing en Banc that
is 19 pages and 5505 words long .... The government's proposed petition raises a single
issue, based on a straightforward and compact factual record; the applicable caselaw
involves a manageable handful of cases. The opinion the United States wants us to
reconsider is itself only about 3500 words, and in that space deals with two issues.
Molina-Tarazon, 285 F.3d at 808.
4. John W. Davis, The Argument of An Appeal, 26 A.B.A.J. 895, 897 (1940), reprinted in 3 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 745, 747 (2001) ("I shall assume that these briefs are models of
brevity....").
5. The Galimanis court discussed the number of issues presented in the opening brief and
noted the observations of J.M. PURVER & L.E. TAYLOR, HANDLING CRIMINAL APPEALS § 91, at 142
(1980): "One of the primary difficulties experienced by appellate counsel is the hesitance to limit the
number of issues presented .... Effective advocacy requires the recognition that if there are one or
two strong arguments for reversal, these should be presented forcefully and others of less merit
eliminated." Galimanis, 728 P.2d at 763.
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as the number of assigned errors increases. Multiplicity hints at lack
of confidence in any one .... [E]xperience on the bench convinces
me that multiplying assignments of error will dilute and weaken a
good case and will not save a bad one.
6
As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Jones v. Barnes,
7
there is no aspect of appellate representation so reflective of the exercise
of discretion by counsel as the determination of which issues should be
raised and argued in the appellate brief.
8
There can hardly be any question about the importance of hav-
ing the appellate advocate examine the record with a view to selecting
the most promising issues for review. This has assumed a greater im-
portance in an era when oral argument is strictly limited in most
courts--often to as little as 15 minutes-and when page limits on
briefs are widely imposed.
9
The Court proceeded to reinforce the desirability of limiting the number
of issues argued on appeal, citing leading authorities for the general
proposition that mixing weak issues with stronger ones will dilute the
overall strength of the appellant's position.10 The majority emphasized
the professional duty of counsel to present the most effective appellate
argument, rejecting the Second Circuit's conclusion that the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of effective assistance required counsel to argue
all non-frivolous claims on the direct appeal, as his indigent criminal
defendant client had directed. 1' In so holding, the majority effectively
concluded that the conduct of the appeal itself was a matter for counsel's
judgment, rather than the client's.
2
This approach was implicitly reaffirmed in Martinez v. California,
13
wherein the Court held that a criminal appellant does not have a right to
6. Robert Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 25 TEMPLE L.Q. 115,
119 (1951).
7. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
8. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 752-53.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 753 (citing Davis, supra note 4, at 897, reprinted in 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
745, 747 (2001); John Godbold, Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes-Effective Advocacy on Appeal,
30 Sw. L.J. 801, 809 (1976) ("[C]ounsel must select with dispassionate and detached mind the issues
that common sense and experience tell him are likely to be dispositive. He must reject other issues or
give them short treatment.")); see also R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 266
(1981) ("The effect of adding weak arguments will be to dilute the force of the stronger ones.").
11. Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 433 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
12. In Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), the Court reemphasized this approach to
narrowing the issues to be argued on appeal, noting that the "'process of winnowing out weaker
arguments on appeal and focusing on' those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of
incompetence," reflects competent appellate advocacy. Smith, 477 U.S. at 536.
13. 528 U.S. 152 (2000). The Court previously held that a criminal defendant had a right to
self-representation at trial in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
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self-representation on appeal,' 4 effectively vesting all matters of strategy
in the conduct of the appeal in counsel. Furthermore, when a defendant is
accorded the option of self-representation on appeal, he relinquishes the
right to complain of ineffective assistance in the appeal, even if counsel
acts in an advisory capacity. The Colorado Court of Appeals addressed
this precise situation in People v. Downey.15 In Downey, the defendant
was appointed a public defender on appeal, but instead chose to proceed
pro se upon motion to the court. 16 On his pro se appeal, the defendant
paid a $3,000 retainer to a private attorney to draft the opening brief, but
the client himself filed the brief pro se.'7 The defendant's election to
proceed with hybrid representation was apparently motivated by negative
prior dealings with attorneys and his desire to determine what issues
would be included in the appeal.1 8 After the convictions were affirmed
on appeal, the defendant subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction
relief, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.' 9 The court
found that "although defendant did delegate responsibility for the actual
drafting of the briefs, the record supports the trial court's conclusion that
defendant did not relinquish his right to self-representation., 20 Thus, the
defendant was denied the ability to assert a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of appellate counsel on collateral attack.2'
It is clear that the concepts of ethical and effective representation
are not synonymous. Yet, it is equally clear that both involve questions
of professionalism in the conduct of the appeal that merit reflection.
There are undoubtedly some instances in which the refusal of counsel to
comply with a client's directive regarding issue selection and presenta-
tion will raise ethical concerns, particularly if counsel deliberately mis-
represents her willingness to proceed in accord with the client's wishes.
This conduct arguably could result in the imposition of sanctions. How-
ever, most discussion of ethical representation on appeal focuses on
avoiding frivolous appeals, properly representing the facts and control-
22 2ling law, and disclosing adverse authority to the court.23 Issue determi-
14. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 163.
15. 994 P.2d 452 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
16. Downey, 994 P.2d at 453.
17. Id. at 454. Although it is not uncommon for lawyers to "ghostwrite" briefs and petitions
for criminal clients, the procedure in Downey might raise an interesting ethical question if the pro se
filing could be taken to suggest some fraud upon the court, particularly when the non-disclosure of
the attorney's involvement is essentially a term of the representation agreement with the client.
18. Id. at 454-55.
19. Id. at 453.
20. Id. at 455.
21. Id.
22. For a devastating critique of inadequate briefing that included misrepresentations and
allegations of misrepresentations by both sides, see Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co.,
905 F.2d 386 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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nation may impact each of these concerns, but it involves a broader ques-
tion of counsel's exercise of discretion that is not so easily pegged to
ethical norms expressed in the Rules of Professional Responsibility.
The conventional wisdom of the experts demands that counsel not
only write sparingly,24 but also that counsel not overburden the appellate
court with multiple questions to consider. 5 Today, appellate practitioners
face a regime of enforced brevity that focuses on word count
26 and font,27
irrespective of any assessment of the merits, even though appellate courts
retain the option of permitting expansion upon their word, line, and page
limits.
28
Given the preference for shorter, tighter briefs, appellate lawyers to-
day must develop strategies in order to address the pressures-from both
courts and colleagues alike-for brevity, while at the same time recog-
nizing the increasingly complex bodies of case law,29 statutes, and ad-
23. ABA MODEL R. PROF. CONDUCr 3.3(a)(3)(2001). The rule states: "A lawyer shall not
knowingly: fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the
lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." Id.
24. See, e.g., Miriam Kass, The Ba Theory of Persuasive Writing, LITIG., Winter 1986, at 47,
47 reprinted in APPELLATE PRACTICE MANUAL 179, 179-80 (Priscilla Anne Schwab ed., 1992).
Think of the reader's mind as a small container. Do not fill it with dead words, bloated
sentences, or other garbage that makes reading feel like eating boney fish or fat meat.
Garbage hogs the space and wastes the mind's energies cleaning house. Adopt the
marketing strategy of Mark Twain: "I never write 'metropolis' for seven cents when I can
get the same price for 'city.'
Id. at 47, reprinted in APPELLATE PRACTICE MANUAL 179, 179-80 (Priscilla Anne Schwab ed.,
1992).
25. Former Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Albert Tate observed:
The questions should be few in number. Rare is that appeal with many reversible errors;
when a great number of questions are presented as serious issues, the judge's expectation
that most or all of them are insubstantial is rarely disappointed. It has sometimes seemed
to me that a large number of insubstantial issues raised might have been abandoned, and
the argument section more tightly concentrated on the arguable issues, if counsel had
attempted to articulate concisely the precise questions for the court to decide before
writing the brief.
Albert Tate, The Art of Brief Writing: What a Judge Wants to Read, in APPELLATE PRACTICE
MANUAL 197, 201 (Priscilla Anne Schwab ed., 1992)(emphasis in original).
26. For example, Rule 32(a)(7) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a
"principal brief is acceptable if . . . it contains no more than 14,000 words; or . . . it uses a
monospaced face and contains no more than 1,300 lines of text... To see how enforcement of the
brief length rules may actually impact on counsel in the individual case, see Clifford S. Zimmerman,
A (Microsoft) Word to the Wise-Beware of Footnotes and Gray Areas: The Seventh Circuit
Continues to Count Words, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROcEss 205,206-10 (2000).
27. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(5) (providing that a proportionally spaced typeface used in
a brief must include serifs and must appear in 14-point or larger size, while a monospaced typeface
may not contain more than 10 characters per inch); FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(6) (requiring use of a
"plain, roman style" typeface, while noting that italics or boldface may be used for emphasis).
28. E.g., Galimanis, 728 P.2d at 762-63 (granting leave to file 80 page opening brief in
complex case, exceeding usual 30 page limit imposed by Rule 28(g) of the Colorado Appellate
Rules).
29. The classic example of the pressure created by the complexity of developed law and issues
arising in the course of complex trials may be illustrated by reference to capital litigation. In a
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ministrative rules that may impact appeal worthy issues in any single
case. Sacrificing analysis for the sake of brevity or simplicity is simply
not the option that it might have been half a century ago; in making the
sacrifice, counsel runs the risk of failing to thoroughly argue the case on
appeal. Nevertheless, counsel can ill afford to ignore the reiterations
from the appellate bench and wisdom of experienced advocates by rou-
tinely straining the limits of a court's patience with overly long, overly
complex briefs. Perhaps more than anything else, this realization sug-
gests the need to carefully consider which issues to brief and which to
orally argue.
I. THREE THOUGHTS ON THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON ISSUE
SELECTION
At the outset, the one clear ethical command driving the decision-
making process should be that appellate counsel competently represent
her client. This is, after all, the basic command of the Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility: "A lawyer shall provide competent legal represen-
tation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the repre-
sentation., 30 Therefore, the conventional wisdom dictates careful selec-
tion of potential issues and refinement of the brief to include only those
issues most likely to be meritorious.31
But the conventional wisdom is fraught with problems.32 First, the
narrowing of issues may convenience the court, but it is unlikely to com-
fort the client, particularly the criminal defendant whose loss of liberty
may be difficult to accept. Second, the narrowing of issues theory pre-
supposes that counsel can always accurately assess precisely which is-
notorious capital case, the Colorado Supreme Court was critical of appellate counsel's conduct in the
litigation, which included the filing of a 138 page "so-called partial brief' and counsel's
representation that it was not possible to file a complete brief within the time limits imposed by the
court. People v. Rodriguez, 794 P.2d 965, 971 (Colo. 1990). The court noted that counsel had been
afforded four extensions of time for filing the opening brief, resulting in a two year delay from the
docketing of the case. Id. Nevertheless, despite this criticism, the court recognized that the defense
had raised a number of constitutional claims requiring it to address issues preserved for appeal "at
some length." Id.
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2001).
31. "A brief that raises every colorable issue runs the risk of burying good arguments-those
that, in the words of the great advocate John W. Davis, 'go for the jugular."' Jones, 463 U.S. at 753
(citing Davis, supra note 4, at 897, reprinted in 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 745, 747 (2001)).
32. Some problems are inherent in the context of the appeal itself. For example, the
conventional wisdom is directly challenged in the context of capital appeals by the recommendation
that appellate counsel raise "all arguably meritorious issues, including challenges to any overly
restrictive appellate rules." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 11.9.2D (1989). This same approach is
reflected in the Supreme Court's admonition in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983): "Thus,
although not every imperfection in the deliberative process is sufficient, even in a capital case, to set
aside a state court judgment, the severity of the sentence mandates careful scrutiny in the review of
every colorable claim of error." Zant, 462 U.S. at 885 (emphasis added).
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sues will not prove successful on appeal. And third, the narrowing of
issues often distorts, rather than illuminates, the nature of the trial on
which the claims of error are predicated.
A. Advocate or officer of the court?
The temptation for appellate counsel to be overly concerned with
the expectation of the appellate court in terms of brief length is under-
standable as courts have threatened and sanctioned appellate lawyers in
recent years for filing frivolous appeals. 33 The Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the proper approach to disposition of frivolous appeals and, of
necessity, frivolous issues, in criminal appeals, recognizing the conflict
inherent in counsel's duties, as both an officer of the court and as the
client's advocate, when the case presents no meritorious issues.34 How-
ever, the problem posed by the issue selection convention supported by
the Jones v. Barnes majority and other commentators does not arise in
the context of frivolous appeals. Instead, the question presented in Jones
addressed counsel's strategic decision to forego argument on potentially
meritorious claims, but only in the context of criminal appeals.35
The Sixth Amendment posture in which Jones v. Barnes was issued
does not address counsel's ethical or professional obligations with regard
to issue selection in civil appeals. Nevertheless, if the conventional wis-
dom that appellant's counsel should limit the number of issues raised and
argued on the direct appeal is sound, it should apply with equal or per-
haps greater force to civil appeals.36 Although similar tactical considera-
33. For an excellent treatment of one court's practices in this regard, see Brent E. Newton,
When Reasonable Jurists Could Disagree: The Fifth Circuit's Misapplication of the Frivolousness
Standard, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 157 (2001). Sanctions may be authorized where a lawyer is
found to have filed frivolous appeals, such as attempting to appeal non-appealable interlocutory
orders. See People v. Smith, 937 P.2d 724, 725-26 (Colo. 1997) (imposing sanctions for previous
frivolous filings in the interlocutory orders).
34. The Court has addressed this problem in a series of cases from Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), through, most recently, Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000). For a thorough
discussion of the Court's original and current views on the proper disposition of frivolous appeal
filings, see James E. Duggan & Andrew W. Moeller, Make Way for the ABA: Smith v. Robbins
Clears a Path for Anders Alternatives, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 65 (2001).
35. State courts may apply Jones to reject claims based on appellate counsel's failure or
refusal to raise colorable claims on behalf of the appellant in a criminal appeal. See, e.g., Howard v.
State, 727 S.W.2d 830, 835 (Ark. 1987) (denying post-conviction relief on claim that appellate
counsel raised regarding insufficient evidence on appeal; holding that ineffectiveness allegation
would presumably require showing that counsel failed to raise some possibly meritorious issue).
"An attorney need not advance every argument, regardless of merit, urged by his client." Id. (citing
Jones, 463 U.S. at 754.
36. The practical reality is, of course, that civil appellate lawyers will not face the prospect of
responding to claims of ineffectiveness in representation on direct appeal, often an avenue of some
hope for criminal defendants. For instance, in Bell v. Lockhart, 795 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1986),
counsel's erroneous advice that led to the defendant waiving his right to appeal constituted
ineffective assistance. Bell, 795 F.2d at 656; accord Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000)
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tions may apply, a civil appeal may present counsel with different issues
for counseling the client on the approach to be taken on appeal.
In the civil appeal, of course, counsel is relatively free to discuss
with the client the omission of these issues from the appellate brief and
probably even encouraged to overrule a client's request that these issues
be raised. Often, the client is less likely than counsel to conclude that his
case will not be treated favorably on a claim of preserved error. Indeed, a
part of the attorney's professional judgment is predicated on the attor-
ney's more experienced understanding of the relative value of claims, as
well as evidence, alternative theories, and the entire realm of decisions
confronting litigators. Experienced attorneys learn, or may instinctively
sense, that some errors committed at trial will not result in reversal or
modification of a judgment on appeal. Clients may simply view error by
the trial judge as a flaw in the process invariably unfair to them as losers
in the lawsuit. Because the client retained counsel, and proceeds with at
least a hope of compensation, the will of the client may well influence an
appellate attorney in viewing issue selection as more a matter of the cli-
ent's determination than the majority's perspective in Jones v. Barnes
would admit.
Moreover, the potential for sanctions imposed by an appellate court
in civil cases is not complicated by the same constitutional concerns that
have governed Sixth Amendment claims of ineffectiveness of counsel in
criminal cases. Older Colorado decisions, for example, demonstrate that
the application of this remedy is not of recent origin. For instance, the
Colorado Supreme Court imposed a twenty percent penalty on a damage
award in a civil action in Florence Oil & Refining Company v. McRae,
37
based on the court's conclusion that the appeal, "entirely without merit,"
had been taken "solely for delay. 38 In an earlier case, Rohrig v. Pear-
son,39 the Colorado Supreme Court apparently considered imposing a
penalty upon the appellant for "trifling with [the] appellee's rights," but
proceeded to review the single claim presented, despite the fact that it
was supported by a one paragraph argument of less than half a page and
without citation to any authority.4 °
(ruling that even failure to advise of right of appeal following conviction on plea of guilty may result
in ineffectiveness determination that defendant was prejudicialy deprived of counsel on appeal).
37. 90 P. 507, 508 (Colo. 1907).
38. Florence Oil, 90 P. at 508. The same party, represented by the same attorney, had been
sanctioned the previous year in Florence Oil & Refining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Canon City, 88 P.
182 (Colo. 1906), when the supreme court complained that the appellant had "needlessly consumed
the time of this court with a question previously settled in this jurisdiction, and vexatiously delayed
and harassed appellee in the collection of a conceded debt... "Florence Oil, 88 P. at 183.
39. 24 P. 1083 (Colo. 1890).
40. Rohrig, 24 P. at 1083. The brief filed by appellant's counsel was, in this instance, too brief
in the eyes of the court, which noted that the trial record consisted of "more than 80 folios." Id.
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More recent Colorado decisions have addressed the standard by
which frivolousness determinations should be made. In Mission Denver
Co. v. Pierson,4' the Colorado Supreme Court reversed a decision by the
court of appeals imposing sanctions for the filing of a frivolous appeal.42
The supreme court addressed both the substantive grounds for imposing
sanctions, as well as the process by which the rights of the party or coun-
sel being sanctioned were to be protected.43 In reversing the court of ap-
peals' judgment awarding damages and double costs, an the supreme court
cautioned that sanctions authorized by the appellate rules45 should be
imposed only in "clear" cases. 46 The court held that a lawyer might ad-
vance a claim unrecognized by existing law if it could be supported "by a
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of exist-
ing law. ' 7 The supreme court reversed because the sanctioned party
presented a rational argument in the court of appeals, which was not
characterized as merely being brought for harassment or delay.48
Should counsel accede to the client's request that specific errors
committed by the trial court be targeted on appeal, despite counsel's best
judgment that they are not likely to result in reversal? This is a difficult
question because while lawyers do serve as officers of the court, most
are, after all, practicing law to earn a living. A client's perception of un-
fairness may be correct; the lawyer's pessimism a jaded product of un-
happy experience. And the appellate court may, in fact, agree with the
more idealistic expectations of the client. Or, the need to maintain a
healthy relationship with the client-particularly the institutional or
business client for whom long term representation is a factor in the rela-
41. 674 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1984).
42. Mission Denver, 674 P.2d at 364.
43. Id. at 365-66.
44. Id. at 364.
45. Rule 38(d) of the Colorado Appellate Rules authorizes the award of damages and "single
or double costs to the appellee." COLO. App. R. 38(d). The rule does not expressly provide a remedy
for impropriety in advancing a frivolous argument in the appellee's defense of a judgment, although
it is not unreasonable to assume that misconduct in use of authority or misrepresentation of the trial
record could warrant imposition of sanctions upon an appellee. Statutory authority for addressing
attorney misconduct appears to provide a basis for imposition of monetary sanctions upon an
offending party or their counsel regardless of which side commits the infraction in litigation at the
trial or appellate level. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-17-102 (West 2002).
46. Mission Denver, 674 P.2d at 366.
47. Id. at 365 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102, superceded by
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2001)).
48. Id. at 366. The "rational argument" test now governs frivolousness determinations under
Colorado law. See, e.g., Zivian v. Brooke-Hitching, 28 P.3d 970, 975 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling
the appeal not frivolous where appellant a made rational argument that trial court erred); Bob Blake
Builders, Inc. v. Gramling, 18 P.3d 859, 867 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling the appeal not frivolous
where appellant presented rational argument and obtained partial relief in remand on some claims);
Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Younger, 856 P.2d 52, 53 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (ruling the appeal not
frivolous where HUD administrative regulations relied upon not previously held applicable to fact
pattern in deficiency action).
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tionship--may suggest the need to litigate more aggressively, even at the
cost of incurring the "wrath" suggested by the conventional wisdom.
This does not mean that counsel can afford to routinely advance merit-
less claims, even at the insistence of a client, because there is always the
possibility that an appellate court will take action to discipline counsel.49
On the other hand, almost all lawyers will run some risk of discipline if
the incentives are great enough.
Proponents of the conventional wisdom on issue selection may have
the benefit of speaking from the perspective of lifetime appointment to
an appellate bench, an unlimited client base or pipeline through success-
ful trial lawyers, or tenure-protected employment in law schools. What
they may lack is the very dynamic of interaction with clients who expect
aggressive litigation at the appellate level having already lost at trial.
This concern was not lost on the dissent in Jones v. Barnes,5° written by
Justice Brennan, which recognized the frustration of criminal defendants
whose appellate lawyers willingly sacrifice non-frivolous issues on the
theory that they can, with certainty, ensure that the appellate courts will
agree with their assessments of the merits of the issues briefed and ar-
gued.5 t Justice Brennan generally agreed with the majority's assessment
of the conventional wisdom, noting:
[T]he Court's advice is good. It ought to be taken to heart by every
lawyer called upon to argue an appeal in this or any other court, and
by his client. It should take little or no persuasion to get a wise client
to understand that, if staying out of prison is what he values most, he
should encourage his lawyer to raise only his two or three best argu-
ments on appeal, and he should defer to his lawyer's advice as to
which are the best arguments. The Constitution, however, does not
require clients to be wise, and other policies should be weighed in the
balance as well. 52
Justice Brennan continued, however:
It is no secret that indigent clients often mistrust the lawyers ap-
pointed to represent them .... A lawyer and his client do not always
share the same interests. Even with paying clients, a lawyer may have
a strong interest in having judges and prosecutors think well of him,
and, if he is working for a flat fee-a common arrangement for
criminal defense attorneys--or if his fees for court appointments are
lower than he would receive for other work, he has an obvious finan-
49. See, e.g., Fin. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Weedman, 968 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Ark. 1998)
(imposing sanction and award of fees for opposing party where counsel's arguments on appeal were
unsupported by facts). And, at the trial level, where a claim asserted in a complaint is wholly
unsupported by evidence, the claim may be characterized as frivolous. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Eason,
976 P.2d 271, 273 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
50. 463 U.S. 745, 755-64 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 761-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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cial incentive to conclude cases on his criminal docket swiftly. Good
lawyers undoubtedly recognize these temptations and resist them, and
they endeavor to convince their clients that they will. It would be na-
ive, however, to suggest that they always succeed in either task.
53
Justice Brennan was thus able to articulate at least one source of the
problem posed when counsel attempts to justify not raising issues that
the client has requested she argue. He explained that a potential threat to
the attorney/client relationship lay in the majority's approach to Sixth
Amendment effectiveness on appeal, in which the client's autonomy is
accorded less value than counsel's expected exercise of sound profes-
sional judgment on the client's behalf. In the aggravated situation, the
relationship may suffer a breakdown as a result of the client's mistrust of
his counsel's motives. Justice Brennan concluded in this vein: "I cannot
accept the notion that lawyers are one of the punishments a person re-
ceives merely for being accused of a crime. 5 4
Justice Brennan's observations are correct in addressing the rela-
tionship of court-appointed counsel and their indigent clients. In fact, for
any criminal defendant, whether able to retain counsel or not, counsel's
explanation that the client's appeal is wholly lacking in merit will, in
most cases, jeopardize any faith the client has in the attorney as his advo-
cate as the client faces the prospect of not only losing the appeal, but
losing any hope for relief. 55 The advice that the appeal is wholly lacking
in merit represents a significantly less compelling problem for the rela-
tionship than the suggestion that certain claims should not be argued, at
least from the theoretical perspective enjoyed by counsel. But for the
client, criminal or civil, who is suspicious of the justice system and who,
having just lost at trial, may be concerned that he has suffered injustice in
the courts already, the message is often the same.
The problem of issue selection in criminal cases and its impact on
the interests of the client is suggested by the recent decision of the Texas
56Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Graves. The court addressed the
issue of successor applications for post-conviction relief in which the
representation afforded by post-conviction counsel on the initial applica-
tion was allegedly constitutionally defective. The petitioner's first post-
conviction counsel failed to include a claim challenging suppression of
evidence by the prosecution-that the accomplice's wife might have
been present at the scene of the murder based on the accomplice's failure
53. Id. at 761-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. For a discussion of the impact of frivolous appeal jurisprudence on the attorney-client
relationship in the context of criminal practice, see Randall L. Hodgkinson, No-Merit Briefs
Undermine the Adversary Process in Criminal Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCEss 55 (2001).
56. 70 S.W.3d 103, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
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of a polygraph question on this point-in the application for relief. 57 The
court rejected the argument that prior counsel's refusal to raise the issue
constituted constitutionally ineffective assistance,58 a relatively simple
resolution because the United States Supreme Court had already held that
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel does
not apply to post-conviction proceedings. 59 But what is so clear is the
court's treatment of first counsel's decision not to raise the issue in the
petitioner's initial application attacking his conviction and death sen-
tence:
As noted above, this claim has already been rejected as an abuse of
the writ. The factual basis for it was known: 1) at the time of trial
when the prosecutor referred to her possible presence at the murder
scene during his closing argument, and 2) at the time of the filing of
the original writ because second habeas counsel states that he urged
the first habeas counsel to include it in the original writ. First habeas
counsel declined to do so. Perhaps he thought it lacked merit.
60
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the capital peti-
tioner had received his "full and fair opportunity to present [his] claims
in a single, comprehensive post-conviction writ of habeas corpus," de-
spite the fact that the petitioner's first post-conviction counsel had not
included the claim raised in the successor petition. 6' As the court's con-
clusion suggests, counsel's failure to raise the claim was not only unex-
plained, but his reasoning, if any, was ultimately irrelevant. The court
offered no explanation to the petitioner facing execution regarding the
rationale behind counsel's decision, except to hold that even deficient
reasoning on the part of counsel would not afford the petitioner a basis
for relief.
Many clients, as noted by Justice Brennan, will readily follow the
advice of counsel to narrow the issues for briefing, and the mere assur-
ances offered by a trusted attorney may be all that are required for both
the attorney and client to proceed without conflict. But for a number of
criminal and civil appellants, trust is impaired by failure at trial, or by the
many other factors that may stress fiduciary relationships in general. In
representing these clients, the conventional wisdom often ignores reality
and the faithful adherence of counsel to the promises made by those es-
pousing that wisdom might compromise the relationship, often leading to
irreparable breach.
57. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 117.
58. Id.
59. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722; 752 (1991).
60. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 117 (emphasis added).
61. Id.
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B. Assessing the likely success of issues
Often counsel must confront the question of issue selection from the
standpoint of the probability that more than one meritorious issue likely
warrants reversal. If the disposition of the various issues would produce
different outcomes, however, such as the situation in which both suffi-
ciency and trial error claims might require reversal, but reversal for trial
error will result in a new trial,62 counsel must consider whether to raise
both issues. In a criminal appeal, counsel should always raise insuffi-
ciency claims, even if potentially meritorious, because a favorable dispo-
sition will result in reversal and acquittal,63 practically ensuring applica-
bility of double jeopardy protections on retrial.64 The Supreme Court's
recent decision in Weisgram v. Marley Co.65 also demonstrates the poten-
tial value to the client of seeking complete relief on a reversal for insuffi-
cient evidence in a civil case. In Weisgram, the Court held that a review-
ing court might well determine that the plaintiff could never meet his
burden, and thus the reviewing court could order rendition of judgment
for the defendant. 66
Part of the problem inherent in the strategic approach implicit in the
conventional wisdom is that it is predicated on counsel being able to ac-
curately assess the merits of the issues that may be raised and argued on
appeal. This might appear an easy decision, but the problem is that coun-
sel's assessment of error and prejudice warranting relief is probably not
perfect, regardless of the weight of authority supporting counsel's posi-
tion.67 And when counsel misjudges the merits of the claims raised, those
62. Even appellate courts may err with regard to the proper disposition on reversal. See Crisco
v. State, 945 S.W.2d 383, 383-84 (Ark. 1997) (changing disposition from dismissal to remand for
possibility of new trial on reversal based on exclusion of evidence).
63. See King v. State, 916 S.W.2d 732, 733-34 (Ark. 1996) (ruling that the court will address
sufficiency challenge prior to considering trial error claims, disregarding claims of trial error to
preclude remand for new trial when dismissal appropriate).
64. See Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18
(1978).
65. 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
66. Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 456-57. For a thorough discussion of Weisgram and the context in
which it arose, see Robert A. Ragazzo, The Power of a Federal Appellate Court to Direct Entry of
Judgment As a Matter of Law: Reflections on Weisgram v. Marley Co., 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
107 (2001).
67. This was the situation the author faced in Fugate v. New Mexico, 470 U.S. 904 (1985),
affg State v. Padilla, 678 P.2d 686 (N.M. 1984). The issue involved application of the Double
Jeopardy Clause to a state prosecution in which the defendant was convicted of driving while
intoxicated (DWI) and careless driving in municipal court, and then prosecuted for homicide by
vehicle in a subsequent proceeding in district court. Padilla, 678 P.2d at 687. Because the vehicular
manslaughter charge required as an element either reckless driving (careless driving identical for
statutory purposes) or DWI, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), which involved a similar
factual scenario to the case in issue. See State v. Fugate, 678 P.2d 710, 711-12 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that the State would continue to apply
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discarded claims may assume an unintended significance for both the
attorney and the client. But the discarded claims will typically not trouble
the appellate court because they simply have not been brought to the
court's attention for consideration.
This is not universally true, of course, as appellate courts do some-
times engage in sua sponte review of claims not raised by appellate
counsel. The exceptional case is, perhaps, Caldwell v. Mississippi.68 At
the defendant's capital trial, the prosecutor minimized the jury's role in
sentencing by arguing that any error made in the imposition of the death
penalty would be corrected on appeal. 69 Trial counsel preserved error by
objecting, but appellate counsel elected not to raise the issue on direct
appeal. 70 The Mississippi Supreme Court noted the claim, but dismissed
the argument as insufficiently prejudicial to require reversal. 71 The
United States Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari on the issue
and eventually reversed.72
Caldwell represents the exception, however, and neither counsel nor
the client can assume that an appellate court will review a claim not
raised on direct appeal, unless the rules of appellate procedure contem-
plate such review. Some jurisdictions do impose such rules for appellate
review, but these rules are typically limited to review in capital cases
imposing the death penalty.73 Otherwise, abandoned claims only present
the "jurisdictional exception" to double jeopardy recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
Diaz v. United States, 233 U.S. 442, 449 (1912). See Padilla, 678 P.2d at 687. In Diaz, the Court had
ruled that a prior judgment rendered would not bar reprosecution if the court initially rendering
judgment would lack jurisdiction over the later prosecution. Diaz, 233 U.S. at 449. Because Fugate's
convictions for DWI and careless driving had been obtained in a municipal court that did not have
jurisdiction over the prosecution of felonies under state law, the state supreme court applied Diaz in
rejecting Fugate's claim in a consolidated appeal. See Padilla, 678 P.2d at 687. Despite the Supreme
Court's reinforcement of Brown in a vehicular homicide/dangerous driving lesser-included charge
case in Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415-21 (1980), the state supreme court persisted in its
application of the "jurisdictional exception." Padilla, 678 P.2d at 687. At the United States Supreme
Court, Fugate lost on a judgment affirmed by an equally divided Court. Fugate, 470 U.S. at 904.
Justice Powell, who had authored the Court's decision in Brown, did not participate because of his
absence from the Court while fighting cancer. Id. The overwhelming weight of authority, including
Brown and Vitale, as well as Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1970), and Robinson v. Neil,
409 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1973), supported Fugate's position, but because there is no opinion issued in
a case affirmed by an equally divided Court, no Justice had to explain or defend their decision in
writing.
68. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
69. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 325-26.
70. Id. at 326.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 323.
73. For example, the Arkansas system of appellate review has two different sources of
authority for sua sponte review. First, Rule 4-3(h) of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court has
traditionally required review of all claims of preserved error, whether or not briefed on appeal, in
cases reviewed on direct appeal by the Supreme Court involving sentences of life imprisonment or
death. ARK. S. CT. R. 4-3(h). Second, Rule 10 of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure-
Criminal now contemplates fundamental error of unpreserved claims in cases in which the death
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a problem for counsel when the appeal fails and the client does not un-
derstand why the claims were abandoned in favor of others that proved
unworthy of relief.
Abandonment of such claims by the appellate lawyer offers the cli-
ent the option of arguing ineffective assistance of counsel in the direct
appeal. In Neill v. Gibson,74 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified
its standard for reviewing ineffectiveness claims based on appellate
counsel's failure to raise a colorable issue on direct appeal.75 The circuit
previously had held that failure to assert a claim that could be character-
ized as a "dead bang winner" would establish ineffectiveness on the part
of appellate counsel. 76 In Neill, the court concluded that its earlier re-
quirement, that the petitioner demonstrate that he would necessarily have
prevailed on the abandoned claim, was contrary to the general rule estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,77 requiring
only a showing of a "reasonable probability" of success but for counsel's
deficient performance in failing to raise the meritorious claim.78
Assuming that an appellate court will typically not reach out to re-
dress an error by counsel in deciding to abandon a meritorious claim
through the process of sua sponte review, counsel's judgment represents
the ultimate buck-stopping point in appellate brinksmanship. Few appel-
lant's counsel-with the exception of cross-appeals, it will be appellant's
counsel who establishes the issues to be reviewed in the brief on direct
appeal-are afforded the luxury of appealing cases in which reversal is
ever guaranteed by precedent.
The problem is compounded by the fact that even the soundest exer-
cise of discretion will not always permit an experienced appellate lawyer
to make an accurate assessment of the relative merits of the points that
might be asserted on appeal. This routinely happens when a court over-
rules the prior decisions on which the client's claim has been predicated.
For example, in Payne v. Arkansas,7 9 the Court held that the admission of
a coerced confession at trial could not be treated as harmless error.80 Fol-
penalty has been imposed, incorporating the categories of fundamental error recognized in Wicks v.
State, 606 S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1980). ARK. R. APp. P. CRim. 10(b)(ii)-(v). To the extent that state
appellate systems contemplate such sua sponte review, the federal courts may review constitutional
claims raised on certiorari or in federal habeas to the extent that review can be presumed in light of
the applicable state law or policy. See Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 547-49 & n.7 (1992)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Joubert v. Hopkins, 75 F.3d 1232, 1241-42
(8th Cir. 1996).
74. 278 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2001).
75. Neill, 278 F.3d at 1057.
76. Id. at 1057 n.5 (discussing United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1995)).
77. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
78. Neill, 278 F.3d at 1057 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-91).
79. 356 U.S. 18 (1958).
80. Payne, 356 U.S. at 568.
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lowing Payne, however, in Chapman v. California,81 the Court con-
cluded that all claims of constitutional error arising in the course of a
trial could be reviewed for harmless error.82 In so doing, however, the
Court noted that, "there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair
trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error., 83 In a
footnote following this statement, the Court set out three examples of
such basic rights to a fair trial-exclusion of coerced confessions, right to
counsel, and impartial judge.84 Subsequently, in Arizona v. Fulminante,85
the defendant, along with the Arizona Supreme Court below, relied on
the statement from Chapman for the proposition that harrless-error
analysis was inapplicable when faced with the admission of a coerced
confession and that the holding of Payne was still good law. 86 The Ful-
minante Court, however, noted that the admission of a coerced confes-
sion, unlike the right to counsel or an impartial judge, involved a "classic
'trial error' that could be addressed through a harmless-error analysis.
87
Thus, the Court held that the admission of a coerced confession by the
trial court was subject to harmless-error analysis.88 However, the Court
found that the coerced confession admitted in Fulminante was, in fact,
sufficiently prejudicial in light of the totality of evidence so as to require
reversal because the admission of the confession was not harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt.89 Accordingly, while the defendant did not suf-
fer as a result of the change of law, the law nevertheless changed in a
manner not at all likely to have been foreseen by his attorney.
Often, however, the law does change in the process of appeal, or
precedent can be limited in its application. In either case, appellant's
counsel may find that even the best exercise of professional judgment did
not include the anticipation that a reviewing court would essentially yank
favorable law out from under the client's issues. For example, the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court changed the process for preservation of error for ap-
pellate review on challenges to the exercise of peremptory strikes
brought pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky9° in MacKintrush v. State.91 In
doing so, the court overruled a series of decisions in which the process
for preservation of Batson challenges had been established and adhered
81. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
82. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
83. Id. at 23.
84. Id. at 24 n.8. In its list of basic rights to a fair trial, the Court cited to Payne and its holding
that the admission of coerced confessions should not be treated as harmless error. See id.
85. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
86. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 284.
87. Id. at 309-10.
88. Id. at 310.
89. Id. at 302.
90. 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986).
91. 978 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Ark. 1998).
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to by Arkansas appellate courts in criminal and civil cases.92 The court
rejected the defendant's Batson claims based on trial counsel's failure to
rebut the prosecutor's race neutral explanation for its use of its peremp-
tory challenges. 93 This requirement, apparently, had not previously been
imposed on Arkansas litigants, but it was consistent with the United
States Supreme Court's intervening holding in Purkett v. Elem.
94
The problem of changes in legal doctrine, moreover, is not confined
to criminal cases. In Shannon v. Wilson,95 for instance, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court overruled some twenty years of precedent in recognizing a
cause of action for dramshop liability.96 Even in his dissenting opinion in
Shannon, Justice Newbem observed:
It is indeed proper for an appellate court of last resort to overrule a
prior decision when that decision was made on the basis of a mistake
or when conditions have changed so as to make it outmoded. Stare
decisis does not require stagnation. The law develops through the ap-
plication of tried-and-true principles to changing times.
97
Justice Newbern was undoubtedly correct in his view of stare decisis, but
defense counsel relying on prior decisions as a basis for exercising pro-
fessional judgment in advising their clients would have likely preferred
that he had the votes to sustain a majority reaffirming the old rule.
Similarly, in Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Ass' n, 98 the Arkansas Su-
preme Court overruled its recent decision on the issue of whether a
wrongful death action would lie for medical malpractice resulting in the
death of a viable fetus.99 The prior decision was little more .than five
years old, but the shift represented a dramatic change in public policy,
paralleling action being taken in the General Assembly.' ° The result
might have correctly anticipated and served the ends of public policy, but
it probably complicated the ability of counsel to properly advise clients
engaged in litigation in which this issue and its disposition were critical.
Changing law not only impacts counsel's judgment with respect to
the recognition of causes of action or defenses in civil or criminal ac-
tions, but changing views on procedural and evidentiary matters may
92. See MacKintrush, 978 S.W.2d at 298.
93. Id.
94. 514 U.S. 765, 767-78 (1995).
95. 947 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1997).
96. Shannon, 947 S.W.2d at 358, overruling Carr v. Turner, 385 S.W.2d 656, 657-58 (Ark.
1965).
97. Id. at 359 (Newbem, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
98. 42 S.W.3d 508 (Ark. 2001).
99. Aka, 42 S.W.3d at 637-38, 641-42, overruling Chatelain v. Kelly, 910 S.W.2d 215, 219
(Ark. 1995).
100. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(B) (Michie 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102(a)(1)-
(3) (Michie 2001).
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also complicate counsel's ability to anticipate the likely success of an
issue on appeal. For instance, in State v. Earnest,10 the New Mexico
Supreme Court reversed the defendant's capital murder conviction based
on the admission of a non-testifying accomplice's custodial statement
implicating himself and others in the commission of the murder. 02 Ap-
plying the United States Supreme Court's holding in Douglas v. Ala-
bama,10 3 the state supreme court concluded that admission of the state-
ment violated Earnest's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amend-
ment because he had never been afforded an opportunity for meaningful
cross-examination of the declarant.1 °4 The New Mexico Attorney Gen-
eral petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, arguing
that an intervening decision in Ohio v. Roberts'0 5 cast doubt on the con-
tinuing validity of Douglas.10 6 Following argument in Earnest and in
light of its recent decision in Lee v. Illinois,0 7 the United States Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the state supreme court, remanding the
case for reconsideration. 0 8 This prompted Justice Rehnquist, in a concur-
ring opinion, to suggest that the statement of Earnest's accomplice might
bear sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant admission, even in the
absence of an opportunity for meaningful cross-examination. °9 On re-
mand, the New Mexico Supreme Court, having undergone a change in
composition, affirmed Earnest's conviction, concluding that the accom-
plice's custodial statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability, as a dec-
laration against his interest, to warrant admission, even in the absence of
cross-examination. "1
0
But Justice Rehnquist's opportunistic concurrence did not settle the
issue. The Court has continued to grapple with the problem of accom-
plice statements and the interplay between hearsay exceptions and the
dictates of the Confrontation Clause. Revisiting the issue in Lilly v. Vir-
ginia,' a plurality of the Court concluded that custodial statements
given by accomplices do not warrant admission as declarations against
penal interest when they tend to shift blame to others." 2 The statement
101. 703 P.2d 872 (N.M. 1985).
102. Earnest, 703 P.2d at 875-76.
103. 380 U.S. 415,418-20 (1965).
104. Earnest, 703 P.2d at 876.
105. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
106. Earnest, 703 P.2d at 876. The Attorney General argued that the United States Supreme
Court had shifted from cross-examination to an indicia of reliability test as the basis for evaluating
confrontation violations in the admission of out-of-court statements. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
107. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
108. New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648, 648 (1986).
109. Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649-50 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
110. State v. Earnest, 744 P.2d 539, 541 (N.M. 1986).
111. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
112. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 133-34 (plurality opinion). The Court had previously limited the
admission of codefendant statements to those expressly self-incriminating and jointly inculpatory
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admitted against Earnest at his capital trial included the declarant's claim
that he had been forced to participate in the murder and never intended to
kill the victim."1
3
Despite Lilly, the New Mexico Supreme Court has persisted in hold-
ing that declarations against penal interest constitute a traditionally rec-
ognized exception to the hearsay rule under state law, as demonstrated in
State v. Martinez-Rodriguez. 114 The state supreme court declined to apply
Lilly to exclude evidence of an out-of court statement included in a letter
written by a non-testifying co-defendant, reiterating the court's prior
position that such statements are "firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay
rule." ' 15 Such a decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court directly
contravenes the Lilly plurality, which stated: "The decisive fact, which
we make explicit today, is that accomplices' confessions that inculpate a
criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hear-
say rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence."" 6
The Earnest litigation demonstrates that counsel's best professional
judgment may ultimately prove prophetic, but still not accurately assess
the prospect for success before any particular court at any given point in
time. Moreover, even assuming counsel makes a correct professional
judgment, no guarantee remains that the reviewing court will accurately
apply the law-requiring additional litigation.'
1 7
C. Presenting a complete picture of the client's case on appeal
Suppose the claim for relief presents both a narrow basis for grant-
ing relief and a far broader question of public policy. An example may be
found in the ongoing attack on the imposition of the death penalty on
mentally retarded capital defendants. In the initial post-Furman v. Geor-
gia' 8 challenge to executing the mentally retarded, Penry v. Lynaugh, 119
a majority of the Court rejected the claim that execution of the mentally
retarded violates the Eighth Amendment. 120 However, the Court also
concluded that the jury instructions given at Penry's trial were constitu-
under the Federal Rules, reserving ruling on the Confrontation Clause issue. See Williamson v.
United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01,605 (1994).
113. Earnest, 744 P.2d at 540.
114. 33P.3d267 (2001).
115. Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d at 278; see also State v. Reyes, 52 P.3d 948, 961 (N.M. 2002)
(continuing to reject Lilly plurality as controlling in New Mexico cases).
116. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134 (plurality opinion).
117. New Mexico is apparently not the only jurisdiction to continue to rely on the declaration
against penal interest exception to justify admission of statements made by accomplices. See, e.g.,
Smith v. State, 24 P.3d 727, 732 (Kan.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 668 (2001).
118. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
119. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
120. Penry, 492 U.S. at 339.
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tionally deficient because they did not properly guide the jury in its con-
sideration of the evidence of Penry's mental retardation as mitigating
circumstance possibly warranting imposition of a life sentence, rather
than death. 12 1 Penry returned to the Supreme Court again in 2001,122 suc-
cessfully arguing inadequacy of the jury instructions given in the pro-
ceedings on remand following his first reversal. 2 3 And finally, this past
term, the Court overruled its first decision in Penry, holding that execu-
tion of the mentally retarded does violate the Eighth Amendment. 24
Sound reasons exist for pursuing both broad policy issues and nar-
rower issues in an appeal, even though an appellate court might prefer
that the former be dropped if the other clearly affords a basis for reversal.
But, realistically, developing a strategy incorporating both broad policy
questions and narrower issues offers counsel a greater potential for assur-
ing success, while also preserving options for further review in the event
that success proves elusive on direct appeal.
Many appeals are resolved on narrow procedural issues, yet these
issues arise in the context of far broader issues of public concern. Coun-
sel may well elect to present multiple issues in which narrow procedural
grounds for relief may be argued in addition to the broader public policy
question. For instance, in any capital case in which the conviction rests
on testimony of interested accomplices, in whole or in part, or on ques-
tionable eyewitness identification,125 counsel might argue a preserved
claim in which the general issue of the reliability of the trial process is
called into question in light of recent executive, judicial, and prosecuto-
rial decisions resulting in release of convicted capital defendants. 126 The
broad question might be whether the death penalty should be imposed on
the basis of uncorroborated accomplice or eyewitness testimony. Un-
doubtedly, few judges will be inclined to accept the proposition that er-
rors in convictions in capital cases will warrant judicial abolition of the
legislatively authorized death penalty. 127 However, the presence of nar-
121. Id. at 328.
122. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
123. Penry, 532 U.S. at 803-04.
124. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002).
125. A leading study documents the significant problems of conviction based upon faulty
eyewitness identification often later disproved by DNA testing. Walter F. Rowe, Commentary, in
CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE
TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL XV (Connors et al. eds., 1996); see also Peter Neufeld &
Barry C. Scheck, Commentary, in id. at xxviii (noting that DNA testing had exonerated an average
of twenty-five percent of arrested suspects annually from 1989 until the date of the study).
126. For example, the Death Penalty Information Center reports that during the period from
1973-2002, 102 death row inmates were freed as a result of "doubts about their guilt . . .
miscarriages of justice in potentially capital cases, . . . and '[i]n spite of innocence."' See Death
Penalty Information Center, Innocence: Freed From Death Row, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo-
.org/Innocentlist.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
127. Judges have expressed reservations about the wisdom of capital punishment in terms of
public policy, even when concluding that the death penalty remains a constitutional alternative. See
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rower procedural grounds for reversal may influence those judges con-
cerned about the broader issues to view the alternative bases for relief
more favorably.1
28
Conventional wisdom might dictate that counsel abandon the broad
policy issue in favor of relying on those grounds more likely to result in
reversal. But if judges are not afforded the opportunity to debate broader
questions, or if they are not forced to consider policy consequences, the
chance that reform will be forced on the justice system from the appellate
courts is minimized, if not wholly negated. For example, it seems rea-
sonable that any opponent of legalized abortion should take the opportu-
nity to seek an overruling of Roe v. Wade,129 even when arguing a case
involving a parental notification rule. 130 Regardless of the disposition on
the narrower claim, the continuing viability of Roe likely depends, at
least in part, on lack of serious challenges to its underlying rationale.' 3' If
Singleton v. Norris, 108 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 1997) (Heaney, J., concurring) ("[A]lthough I am
compelled to adhere to the law, I nonetheless announce my personal view that this nation's
administration of capital punishment is simply irrational, arbitrary, and unfair. The problems are
inherent in the enterprise itself."); New Mexico v. Clark, 990 P.2d 793, 821 (N.M. 1990) (Franchini,
J., concurring). More recently, two federal district judges have held the Federal Death Penalty Act
unconstitutional, at least in part because of concerns that procedural protections afforded capital
defendants under the federal statute are insufficient to prevent wrongful convictions. See United
States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v. Fell, 217 F.
Supp. 2d 469, 489-91 (D. Vt. 2002). However, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's ruling
in Quinones, finding that the Federal Death Penalty Act does not violate the accused's Fifth
Amendment right to due process. See United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 52-53 (2d Cir. 2002).
128. Consider Judge Franchini's recent opinion in a 3-2 split decision reversing an imposed
death penalty because of trial court error in failing to properly admonish the defendant of his right to
jury sentencing upon his plea of guilty to capital murder. State v. Martinez, 43 P.3d 1042, 1044
(N.M. 2002). It seems unlikely that Judge Franchini's swing vote to reverse was unrelated to his
general reservations concerning the death penalty.
129. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194 (1973) (holding Georgia
statutory scheme regulating abortion unconstitutional).
130. E.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,425 (1981) (upholding notification scheme); Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (rejecting notification scheme).
131. In fact, the post-Roe history of challenges is replete with consistent attacks on the
availability of abortion, in part, perhaps, explaining the significance of Roe as an issue in the judicial
confirmation process. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000) (finding a state statute
banning "partial birth abortion" unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 880-
901 (1992) (upholding some restrictions on abortion practice as not imposing undue burden on
patients seeking abortions); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (upholding prohibition on
abortion counseling by recipients of federal family planning funds); Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., Inc., 492 U.S. 490, 492 (1989) (upholding statutory ban on use of public funds for abortion);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 493 n.20 (1983) (upholding parental
notification or alternative juvenile court consent as constitutional, while holding requirement for
performance of abortions in a hospital after 12 weeks of pregnancy unconstitutional); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding Congressional limitations on use of federal funds to
reimburse for costs of abortions); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446-48 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 470-71, 474, 477, 480 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (non-funding of
abortion for indigent patient does not violate equal protection); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 65, 67, 71, 75, 79, 81, 83-84 (1976) (striking down certain regulations on abortion
procedures, while upholding statutory definition of "viability").
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the party ultimately seeks to overrule Roe, then counsel should likely
consider taking any reasonable opportunity to advance the client's ulti-
mate position, rather than restricting the appeal to the more narrow issue
on which a favorable ruling is far more likely.
II. TACTICAL GROUNDS FOR A POLICY OF ISSUE INCLUSION
There are two distinct tactical decisions confronting appellate coun-
sel in the issue selection process. The first decision concerns the question
of inclusion or rejection of issues likely to warrant reversal based on
counsel's judgment. The troubling aspect of this problem, in light of the
advice to eliminate issues, is that the advice-givers are essentially asking
counsel to reject claims that probably warrant relief. This is often a diffi-
cult decision to make since there is no guarantee that the appellate court
will agree with counsel's assessments that the trial court did err, or that
prejudice warrants relief even if error is demonstrated.
The second decision concerns counsel confronting a well-preserved
trial record involving the presence of preserved errors that are insufficiently
prejudicial to warrant reversal. These claims--colorable or at least poten-
tially meritorious, depending upon how one chooses to define "meritori-
ous"-are subject to being discarded in the issue selection process because
they do not offer serious prospects for relief.
There are, however, at least three valid reasons for including issues
which have little prospect for success on appeal despite an obvious or
arguable error on the part of the trial court and apart from the very real
value in simply pleasing the client as her advocate. First, there are often
issues that warrant review that will likely not benefit the client or the
client's interest in the immediate case. Second, there are issues that
should be raised to develop a theme of cumulative error, whether formal
or informal, and to demonstrate the unfairness of the trial, even if the
jurisdiction does not recognize a doctrine of cumulative error. And third,
often reversing courts will address other issues to resolve questions likely
to arise in the event of retrial.
With these thoughts in mind, it is possible to identify a number of
tactical arguments for considering issue inclusion, rather than exclusion,
as the underlying basis for appellate strategy.
A. Raise all issues truly meriting reversal to avoid the consequences of
mistake in judgment
Because counsel may fail to appreciate flaws in the case or overes-
timate the controlling power of prior decisions, the best approach is to
include all claims on which reversal can reasonably be expected in light
of precedent. This avoids the problem of affirmance by surprise when the
appellate court essentially disagrees with counsel's assessment of the
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strength of precedent, its application to the issue precisely before the
court, or the factual similarity of the immediate case to that underlying
the application of the rule in prior cases.
132
Even if prior decisions appear thoroughly persuasive and disposi-
tive, counsel cannot dismiss the possibility that even the most established
rule of law may be overruled by a court that is inclined to view it as out-
dated, in the event it is a long-standing rule, 133 or insufficiently grounded,
if it is relatively recent. A change in the composition of an appellate
court or the rising or diminishing influence of a key judge may lead to a
rejection of precedent. This happened in Booth v. Maryland134 with re-
spect to the issue of admission of "victim impact" evidence in capital
sentencing proceedings. In 1987, a majority of the United States Su-
preme Court rejected admission of such evidence as violative of the
Eighth Amendment and due process considerations. 135 Two years later,
in South Carolina v. Gathers,136 a majority reaffirmed Booth, rejecting
the admissibility of victim impact evidence. 37 Yet, a mere two years
later, a shift in the majority of the Court with the retirement of Justice
Brennan and appointment of Justice Souter resulted in an overruling of
Booth and Gathers in Payne v. Tennessee.138 In doing so, the Court noted
that the two prior holdings "were decided by the narrowest of margins,
132. The application of precedent is almost always governed by the factual similarities
underlying the prior disposition and those presented in a subsequent case before an appellate court.
In People v. Wilson, 838 P.2d 284 (Colo. 1992) (en banc), the issue before the Colorado Supreme
Court was whether a trial court's failure to give a statutorily-prescribed admonition concerning the
reliability of hearsay statements by children identified as victims of sexual assault would constitute
plain error justifying relief in the absence of preservation by objection at trial. Wilson, 838 P.2d at
284-85, 288-89. In prior decisions, the court had concluded that similar omissions did not constitute
plain error on the facts, but did warrant relief on the facts, like in People v. McClure, 779 P.2d 864,
867 (Colo. 1989) (en banc). See also People v. Wood, 743 P.2d 422, 428 (Colo. 1987) (en banc).
Shortly after issuing McClure, the court again held that plain error was not committed. See People v.
Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741, 751-52 (Colo. 1989). The Wilson court rejected the defendant's reliance
on McClure, noting that the factual differences presented by the prior decisions governed the court's
disposition in each case. Wilson, 838 P.2d at 290 ("the results of these cases turn on their particular
facts").
133. E.g., Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2443 (2002), overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639 (1990) (holding that imposition of death sentence by trial judge, rather than jury, after
determination of aggravating and mitigating circumstances violates federal constitutional
protections).
134. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
135. Booth, 482 U.S. at 501-02.
136. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
137. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810. Justice White, who dissented in Booth, joined in the majority
opinion written by Justice Brennan in Gathers, noting in a separate concurrence that unless Booth
was going to be overruled by the Court, he would join with the majority. Id. at 812 (White, J.,
concurring). Justice Powell, who had written the majority opinion in Booth, had left the Court.
138. 501 U.S. 808, 811, 827-30 (1981). Justice Souter replaced Justice Brennan, who had
written the majority opinion in Gathers and joined Justice Powell in the majority in Booth. Justice
Souter joined the Payne majority in overruling the prior decisions of the Court.
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over spirited dissents challenging the basic underpinnings of those deci-
sions.139
A recent development in the Arkansas Supreme Court reinforces the
point that counsel cannot assume too much stability on the part of an
appellate court. In two fairly recent decisions, Brown v. State'40 and Hill
v. State,14 1 the court had rejected claims of error based on the trial court's
refusal to instruct on second-degree murder and manslaughter, respec-
tively, as lesser-included offenses of felony murder. 142 In McCoy v.
State,143 the court "receded" from those and other decisions that had lim-
ited lesser-included offense analysis to exclude lessers not predicated on
a strict elements analysis. 44 Both trial and appellate counsel might have
justly concluded that the recent decisions would have remained viable,
but, in fact, there were strong theoretical arguments countering the re-
striction on lessers under Arkansas law. McCoy's counsel preserved er-
ror and refused to give up on a potentially meritorious claim.
This point can hardly be stressed too vigorously. Counsel should
never feel assured of victory based on even the best assessment of the
merits of a claim or on the basis of the strength of the claim in terms of
precedent or supporting facts.
B. Always give the appellate court an "out" in the tough case
All constitutional lawyers are aware of the traditional tendency of
the United States Supreme Court to decline to consider broad issues of
policy when narrower grounds for reversal are available to the Court. A
classic example is presented by the Court's disposition of the claimed
right to treatment for involuntarily committed mental patients, a core
concern in the litigation in O'Connor v. Donaldson.145 The Fifth Circuit
addressed the issue directly, noting at the outset: "The question for deci-
sion, whether patients involuntarily civilly committed in state mental
hospitals have a constitutional right to treatment, has never been ad-
dressed by any of the federal courts of appeals."' 146 The court concluded
that the patient had a constitutionally protected interest in treatment.
47
139. Payne, 501 U.S. at 829.
140. 929 S.W.2d 146 (Ark. 1996).
141. 40 S.W.3d751 (Ark. 2001).
142. Brown, 929 S.W.2d at 148; Hill, 40 S.W.3d at 756. Capital felony murder is set out in
section 5-10-101(a)(1)-(2) of the Arkansas Code. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(a)(1)-(2) (Michie
2001). First degree felony murder is defined in section 5-10-102(a)(1) of the Arkansas Code. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-10-102(a)(1) (Michie 2001).
143. 69 S.W.3d 430 (Ark. 2002).
144. McCoy, 69 S.W.3d at 437, on State's petition for review from 49 S.W.3d 154 (Ark. App.
2002). The court of appeals had also reversed on direct appeal. Id. at 431.
145. 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975).
146. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 1974).
147. Donaldson, 493 F.2d at 520.
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On certiorari, the Supreme Court concluded that Donaldson's rights
had been violated, but did not adopt the Fifth Circuit's broad approach to
the issues presented. 148 Instead, the Court noted:
We have concluded that the difficult issues of constitutional law
dealt with by the Court of Appeals are not presented by this case in its
present posture. Specifically, there is no reason now to decide
whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to others
have a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the State,
or whether the State may compulsorily confine a non-dangerous,
mentally ill individual for the purpose of treatment. As we view it,
this case raises a single, relatively simple, but nonetheless important
question concerning every man's constitutional right to liberty.
The jury found that Donaldson was neither dangerous to himself
nor dangerous to others, and also found that, if mentally ill, Donaldson
had not received treatment. That verdict, based on abundant evidence,
makes the issue before the Court a narrow one. We need not decide
whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person may be
confined by the State on any of the grounds which, under contemporary
statutes, are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement of
such a person-to prevent injury to the public, to ensure his own sur-
vival or safety, or to alleviate or cure his illness. 
149
The Court concluded, on a narrow ground, that Donaldson had been de-
prived of his freedom by the continued confinement without a showing
of the necessity for institutionalization. 15 Instead of seizing the opportu-
nity to make a powerful constitutional statement on the proper role of
treatment in the involuntary commitment process, the Court narrowed the
issue to the question of whether O'Connor, the superintendent of the
state mental facility, could be held liable for monetary damages for his
role in depriving Donaldson of liberty in his continued confinement.1
5 '
The Court expressly directed the Fifth Circuit as follows:
Upon remand, the Court of Appeals is to consider only the ques-
tion whether O'Connor is to be held liable for monetary damages for
violating Donaldson's constitutional right to liberty. The jury found,
on substantial evidence and under adequate instructions, that O'Con-
nor deprived Donaldson, who was dangerous neither to himself nor to
others and was provided no treatment, of the constitutional right to
liberty. That finding needs no further consideration. If the Court of
148. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 573.
149. Id. at 573-74.
150. Id. at 577 n.12 (basing its holding on the absence of any evidence demonstrating that
Donaldson presented a danger to himself or others).
151. Id.
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Appeals holds that a remand to the District Court is necessary, the
only issue to be determined in that court will be whether O'Connor is
immune from liability for monetary damages. 
152
The Supreme Court's approach in O'Connor illustrates the point
that appellate courts often avoid substantial issues and rule on narrow
grounds that may afford relief without establishing potentially troubling
precedent. 153 While the interest of law reform may well only be served
by attempting to force appellate courts to reach issues having broad pol-
icy implications, the individual client's interests may also only be served
by affording the appellate court an alternative basis for deciding the case
in the client's interest, even while avoiding the broader issues. Counsel,
therefore, should always consider giving the appellate court an alterna-
tive ground for relief or review in the event the bigger question is one the
reviewing court is not prepared to tackle.
154
Often, the cases in which reversal is most appropriate arise in the
context of flawed proceedings directly attributable to misconduct by the
trial judge. Just as courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
will search for ways to avoid overly broad rulings by choosing narrower
bases for deciding cases, courts will often avoid rulings that embarrass
lower court judges. For example, in Ruth v. State, 55 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed on the thirtieth issue raised by the appellant
on a point that even the authoring judge found unpersuasive, but con-
trolled by precedent. 156 The more significant points on appeal argued
egregious misconduct by the retired judge sitting as a visiting judge at
the defendant's trial. Many of those points attacked the trial judge's ag-
gressive assistance in prosecuting the case on behalf of the District At-
torney's Office, which otherwise had no difficulty in securing convic-
tions.
The importance of providing a reviewing court with legal maneu-
verability is suggested by the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in
Brockwell v. State,157 in which Dewey Brockwell was convicted of sec-
ond-degree murder in the shooting death of his son-in-law, Griffin.'
58
The circumstances suggested a justified homicide, as Griffin was a vio-
152. Id.
153. In O'Connor, the Court noted: "Of necessity our decision vacating the judgment of the
Court of Appeals deprives that court's opinion of precedential effect, leaving this Court's opinion
and judgment as the sole law of the case." Id.
154. E.g., Blecker v. Kofoed, 672 P.2d 526, 528 n.4 (Colo. 1983) ("Our disposition of this case
makes it unnecessary to ... consider the applicability of Converse v. Zinke, 635 P.2d 882 (Colo.
1981), relied on by petitioner as an alternative ground for relief.").
155. 653 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
156. Ruth, 653 S.W.2d at 438 & n.1; see Brief for Appellant at 48, Ruth v. State, 653 S.W.2d
437 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (F78-5812-NQ).
157. 545 S.W.2d 60,63-64 (Ark. 1976).
158. Brockwell, 545 S.W.2d at 60.
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lent neighbor who had been abusive and threatened Brockwell's daughter
and other family members. 59 Brockwell shot his son-in-law as he ap-
proached the front door of the Brockwell residence after making drunken
threats directed at the defendant.160 But Griffin was not armed and he had
not tried to enter the Brockwell house when he was shot. 16 1 There was
evidence that Brockwell warned another neighbor about possible vio-
lence, then prepared to defend himself by loading his shotgun with buck-
shot and warning his wife and daughter to go to the bedroom as Griffin
approached the house. 62 The supreme court held the evidence legally
sufficient to support conviction.1
63
However, a majority of the supreme court concluded that prejudicial
error occurred in the admission of a photograph depicting Griffin with
his shirttail tucked in after the shooting.' 64 Justice Fogelman found ad-
mission of the photo to be prejudicial in light of Brockwell's trial testi-
mony that he thought Griffin had a gun behind his back when he shot,
apparently suggesting that Brockwell was lying. 65 This drew a sharp
dissent from Chief Justice Harris. 16 6 He argued that there was no evi-
dence in the record to support any conclusion that Brockwell's ability to
observe a weapon had been obscured by the shirttail; whether it was out
or tucked in would have logically made no difference in the jury's per-
ception of the justification offered by the defendant. 67 Brockwell himself
had testified that he could not see Griffin's hands because they were be-
hind him, not because of Griffin's long shirttail.
68
The majority, interestingly, also listed a number of issues identified,
but not argued, in the appellant's brief that were deemed waived, as well
as rejecting unpreserved claims of error in closing argument.169 And the
Chief Judge, in dissent, opened his opinion: "I cannot agree that the case
should be reversed for the reason given by the majority."' 170
The tenor of the majority opinion suggests that the supreme court
was convinced that Brockwell should not have been convicted on the
facts of the case, probably because Griffin earned so little sympathy in
his treatment of his ailing wife and threats made against her family. 171 In
159. Id. at 63.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 67.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 60.
164. ld. at64.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 68 (Harris, C.J., dissenting).
167. Id. (Harris, C.J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Harris, C.J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 64.
170. Id. at 68 (Harris, C.J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 63.
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order to afford the defendant a second chance, the majority may have
simply grasped at an issue on which a reversal could be based in order to
avoid an unjust conviction. At least some of the issues waived due to
lack of briefing and argument might have suggested better grounds for
reversal or, at least, grounds that might have persuaded the dissenting
justices. Nonetheless, Brockwell did obtain a new trial because his appel-
late lawyer gave the reviewing court a way Out.
1 72
C. Preserve the opportunity to benefit from new law
Judicial doctrine governing retroactivity and prospective application
of new decisions offers another rationale for including issues in the direct
appeal and discretionary review process, rather than excluding them in
the absence of precedent clearly suggesting success. Typically, issues
may arise almost simultaneously in a number of cases as a result of new
developments, such as amendments to legislation, or emerging trends in
legal theory reflected in scholarly commentary, or appellate decisions
rendered in other jurisdictions. Particularly when counsel is aware of
these developments, it is important to realize the issues litigated at trial
do not exist in a vacuum. Inclusion of issues on direct appeal that may
offer the prospect for relief in the future may end up proving successful
in the case at hand. This is because courts typically apply judicial deci-
sions retroactively, but apply legislative enactments prospectively.
1 73
Criminal appellate lawyers are well aware of the "new rules" doc-
trine articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v.
Lane.174 Teague is not particularly popular because it essentially limits
the retroactive application of new rules or principles of constitutional
criminal procedure for cases on collateral review-the overwhelming
majority of which will not be retroactive under the doctrine. 75 But the
Court left intact an important principle of retroactivity that had been ap-
plied in Griffith v. Kentucky.176 All litigants with preserved claims of
constitutional criminal procedure error are entitled to benefit from a new
rule announced by the Supreme Court, so long as their cases have not
been finalized in the direct review process by the denial of certiorari
prior to the announcement of the new rule.177 Thus, error preserved at
trial under an old regime may prove reversible if the Court announces a
new rule or interpretation of an existing law while the direct appeal or
172. Id. at 60.
173. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 111-12 (Colo. 1992).
174. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
175. See, e.g., Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 2001) (superceded by statute); In re
Clemmons, 259 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Hanrahan v. Thieret, 933 F.2d 1328, 1337
n. 19 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[Wje explicitly considered and rejected the Teague argument .....
176. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
177. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323.
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subsequent application for discretionary review remains pending in state
or federal court. 78
The practical benefits of Griffith are evident in major decisions of
the Court that impose significant changes in procedure. For example,
literally dozens of cases were affected by the Court's decision in Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey.179 The Court held that an element of the prosecu-
tion's sentencing case used to increase the sentencing range beyond the
presumptive sentence imposed by statute must be pleaded in the charging
instrument and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 80 Not only
has Apprendi spawned additional litigation governing its scope, with
three cases being heard during the Court's current term, but clients'
counsel who included issues on point in their briefs while the case was
pending benefited from the application of the new rule in their cases.1
81
The principles governing retroactivity and prospective application in
civil litigation are not as strongly articulated as in the constitutional
criminal procedure context.'82 The Supreme Court has itself recognized
fundamental underlying policy differences in criminal and civil litiga-
tion, which explains the application of less rigorous principles of retroac-
tivity to pending civil cases than those applied in the criminal context of
178. Id. at 326-27.
179. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). For example, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Eleventh
Circuit cases in which Apprendi issues have been rejected by the circuit court and remanded for
reconsideration in light of it. See Tapia v. United States, 531 U.S. 1136 (2001), vacating United
States v. McGuire, 220 F.3d 589 (1lth Cir. 2000); Cloud v. United States, 531 U.S. 1062 (2001)
vacating United States v. Cloud, 211 F.3d 599 (11th Cir. 2000); Hayes v. United States, 531 U.S.
1062 (2001), vacating United States v. Hayes, 212 F.3d 598 (1 1th Cir. 2000); Ardley v. United
States, 531 U.S. 1063 (2001) vacating United States v. Ardley, 202 F.3d 287 (1 1th Cir. 1999); Dore
v. United States, 531 U.S. 1109 (2001), vacating United States v. Dore, 200 F.3d 819 (11th Cir.
1999); Griffiths v. United States, 531 U.S. 1109 (2001), vacating United States v. Walker, 194 F.3d
1322 (1 1th Cir. 1999); Ford v. United States, 532 U.S. 968 (2001), vacating United States v. Ford,
228 F.3d 417 (11th Cir. 2000); Bayona v. United States, 531 U.S. 1135 (2001), vacating United
States v. Bayona, 213 F.3d 646 (1 1th Cir. 2000); Phillips v. United States, 531 U.S. 1109 (2001),
vacating United States v. Phillips, 216 F.3d 1091 (11 th Cir. 2000); Ravelo v. United States, 532 U.S.
955 (2001), vacating United States v. Torres, 229 F.3d 1166 (11th Cir. 2000); Wims v. United
States, 531 U.S. 801 (2000), vacating United States v. Wims, 207 F.3d 661 (11 th Cir. 2000); Brown
v. United States, 531 U.S. 920 (2000), vacating United States v. Brown, 207 F.3d 662 (11th Cir.
2000); Curry v. United States, 531 U.S. 953 (2000), vacating United States v. Curry, 211 F.3d 129
(11 th Cir. 2000); Potts v. United States, 531 U.S. 1006 (2000), vacating United States v. Potts, 211
F.3d 598 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
180. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
181. United States v. Cotton, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002); Harris v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2406
(2002); Ring, 122 S. Ct. 2428.
182. The Colorado Supreme Court noted that the United States Constitution:
neither prohibits nor requires retroactive application of a judicial decision, and the
question of retrospective or prospective application of a state judicial decision to civil
litigation in the state courts is a matter of state law when.., the rule in question involves
a matter of a common-law tort and is not based on federal constitutional or statutory law.
Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 112.
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Griffith.183 A majority of the Court formulated a multifactor approach in
determining retroactivity applicability in civil cases in Chevron Oil Co.
v. Huson.184 The Court followed Chevron in American Trucking Ass' ns,
Inc. v. Smith,185 and explained that the impact of applying new rules to
pending civil cases may unfairly penalize parties who relied on existing
law at the commencement of litigation or earlier, when the facts giving
rise to the litigation actually occurred. 186 The Court observed: "[W]hen
the Court concludes that a law-changing decision should not be applied
retroactively, its decision is usually based on its perception that such
application would have a harsh and disruptive effect on those who relied
on prior law.'
187
Although Griffith itself works some disadvantage for the prosecutor
who had relied on prior law, the Court drew a line favoring limited retro-
active application of new rules to benefit those defendants whose non-
final cases raised issues addressed by changes in law announced by the
Court during pendency of the appeal.188 According to the American
Trucking majority, the Griffith rule reflected a determination that it was
simply preferable to expand the procedural protections afforded criminal
defendants.1
8 9
Subsequently, in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,19° a
different alignment of the Court rejected the argument that new rules
applicable to civil litigation should be enforced differently than rules of
criminal procedure. 191 Overruling Chevron, and thus applying the Griffith
rationale to civil litigation, the Harper Court stated:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it,
that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be
given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and
as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate
our announcement of the rule. This rule extends Griffith's ban against
"selective application of new rules." Mindful of the "basic norms of
183. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323.
184. 404 U.S. 97 (1971). Chevron required consideration of three factors in determining
whether a new rule of civil law should be given retroactive effect: 1) Whether, in fact, a judicial
decision has established a new rule of law, constituting a break with prior law or overruling
precedent, or recognizing a new application of law not clearly foreshadowed by existing rules; 2)
Examination of the history of the rule in question to determine its purpose and effect and whether
retrospective application will further or retard the operation of the rule; and 3) Weighing the inequity
imposed by retroactive application of the rule against the benefits of retroactive application.
Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07.
185. 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
186. American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 191-94.
187. Id. at 191.
188. Id. at 198.
189. Id.
190. 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
191. Harper, 509 U.S. at 97.
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constitutional adjudication" that animated our view of retroactivity
in the criminal context, we now prohibit the erection of selective
temporal barriers to the application of federal law in non-criminal
cases .... Our approach to retroactivity heeds the admonition that
"the Court has no more constitutional authority in civil cases than in
criminal cases to disregard current law or to treat similarly situated
litigants differently."
92
The decision in Harper recognized a different value than American
Trucking. Rather than reflect concern for reliance on civil litigants to
existing law, the Harper majority focused on unfairness to litigants who
would be similarly situated in the litigation process, but suffer disparate
impact from the limited application of new rules. 93
Another way to view Griffith is that the limited retroactivity princi-
ples reward the creativity and diligence of counsel in preserving novel or
emerging claims for review. Specifically, it avoids penalizing those de-
fendants who might be unlucky enough not to have review granted in
their cases, as the American Trucking majority had conceded.' 4 Further,
even though Griffith has not been extended as a matter of constitutional
necessity to all civil litigation-being limited in Harper to issues of con-
stitutional construction-the limited retroactivity rule may nevertheless
favor civil litigants in state court proceedings.19
5
As might be expected, state courts are split with regard to their ap-
proaches to retroactivity of newly articulated principles of civil law.'
96
For example, in Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 97 the
New Mexico Supreme Court considered retroactive application of a
cause of action in tort for conduct pre-dating its recognition in the state
courts. 198 The court of appeals had held that liability could not be im-
posed on conduct occurring prior to recognition of the tort of outrage. 199
The state supreme court framed the question: "This case involves one of
the great jurisprudential debates of the twentieth century: Whether an
appellate court decision announcing a new rule of law, or changing an
old one, should always be applied retroactively or may sometimes be
192. Id. (citations omitted).
193. Id.
194. American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 190-91 ("As a practical matter, of course, we cannot hear
each case pending on direct review and apply the new rule. But we fulfill our judicial responsibility
by instructing the lower courts to apply the new rule retroactively to cases not yet final." (quoting
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323)).
195. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322 (citing Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07).
196. See, e.g., Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 881 P.2d 1376, 1381 (N.M.
1994); Robbat v. Robbat, 643 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); City of New Bem v. New
Bern-Craven County Bd. of Educ., 450 S.E.2d 735 (N.C. 1994).
197. 881 P.2d 1376.
198. Beavers, 881 P.2d at 1386-87.
199. 859 P.2d 497, 499-500 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
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applied only prospectively.' °° The New Mexico Supreme Court con-
cluded that the cause of action would apply retroactively, even to con-
duct occurring prior to recognition of the tort.20' It did not rely, however,
on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Harper in reaching that
result.20 2 Instead, Justice Montgomery rejected the position that as a court
of last resort it was forced to choose between a policy of "retroactivity
and prospectivity in civil cases," as the majority in Harper viewed the
limitation placed on the Supreme Court.20 3 Instead, the state supreme
court adopted a presumption favoring retroactivity in civil litigation and
applied it to Beavers' cause of action for tort of outrage.
204
Similarly, in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz,20 5 a leading Colorado
decision on retroactive application of newly announced wrongful dis-
charge law, the Colorado Supreme Court split on whether recognition of
a limitation on the traditional at will employment doctrine could apply to
a termination occurring in 1975,6 years before the court of appeals rec-
ognized a public policy exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will
in Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Electric Ass'n.20 7 Applying Chevron's
three-part analysis, 208 the majority concluded that the exception applied
in Cronk afforded Lorenz a cause of action for wrongful discharge. 2°
Justice Erickson, joined by Chief Justice Rovira and Justice Vollack,
dissented in part, arguing that the exception should be recognized, but
not applied retroactively because of unfairness in penalizing parties who
relied on prior law. 210
In contrast, the Arkansas Supreme Court engaged in prospective de-
cision-making in Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Ass'n,2 11 when it overruled its
prior decision in Chatelain v. Kelley.21 2 In Chatelain, the court held that
the plaintiff could not sustain a wrongful death action for an injury that
resulted in the death of a viable fetus.213 Subsequently, in Aka, the court
applied its determination that Chatelain should be overruled to benefit
the party who expended the "time, effort and money to raise an attack
200. Beavers, 881 P.2d at 1377 n..
201. Id. at 1383.
202. Id. at 1378.
203. Id. at 1381. For another interesting treatment of retroactivity analysis by a state court, see
In re Commitment of Thiel, 625 N.W.2d 321, 327 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (declining to follow Harper;
applying Chevron analysis).
204. Beavers, 881 P.2d at 1383.
205. 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992).
206. Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 113.
207. 765 P.2d 619, 622-23 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
208. Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 112-14.
209. Id. at 114.
210. Id. at 117, 120 (Erickson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211. 42 S.W.3d 508, 518 (Ark. 2001).
212. 910 S.W.2d 215 (Ark. 1995).
213. Chatelain, 910 S.W.2d at 219.
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upon existing unsound precedent[s], '21 4 while electing not to burden oth-
ers who had relied on existing law. The court explained:
When this court overrules a prior decision and states the rule to be
followed in the future, we also acknowledge the need to rely upon the
validity of actions taken in faith upon the old decision .... However,
given that the overruling of a decision relates back to the date of the
overruled decision, we have also observed that no matter how a new
rule of law is applied, the benefit of the new decision is denied to
some injured persons.
215
Thus, in sharp contrast to the positions taken by the Harper majority
and the New Mexico Supreme Court in Beavers, the Arkansas policy
appears to limit potential unfairness by adopting prospective applica-
tion.21 6 Nevertheless, Aka certainly reminds Arkansas lawyers of the po-
tential for benefit from overruling of adverse precedent applicable to
their clients' case, while reassuring counsel of a generally conservative
policy favoring stability in the application of state law. 217 Moreover,
practitioners litigating state and federal constitutional claims in the same
case need to remain cognizant of the differing standards for retroactive
application of new rules that may be applied in state and federal courts.
D. Preserving the cumulative error claim
One of the most compelling arguments against issue exclusion ap-
plies in those jurisdictions that recognize doctrines of cumulative error.
In order to prevail on a claim of cumulative error, counsel must comply
with preservation requirements for the presentation of the issue.218 In
some courts, combination of errors in a single issue relying on a cumula-
tive error doctrine will preserve the issue for appellate review. l 9 In oth-
ers, it will be necessary to advance each claim of error independently and
then argue a separate cumulative error claim.220 Regardless, exclusion of
preserved or even unpreserved, but cognizable, claims of error as part of
the "winnowing" process advocated by proponents of the conventional
wisdom may jeopardize the client's ability to seek relief based on com-
214. Aka, 42 S.W.3d at 519.
215. Id. (citations omitted),
216. Id. at 518.
217. Id. at 515.
218. People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920, 940-41 (111. 2000).
219. See Blue, 724 N.E.2d at 941.
220. For example, Texas recognizes cumulative error, but also requires that claims of error be
presented and argued separately, and then reargued for cumulative error. See, e.g., Feldman v. State,
71 S.W.3d 738, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ("Appellant asserts in his twentieth and twenty-first
points of error that the 'cumulative effect' of all of the above errors denied him due process under
the federal constitution and due course of law under the Texas constitution. A number of errors may
be found harmful in their cumulative effect." (citing Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999))).
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mission of multiple errors by the trial court that, independently, might
not warrant relief.22' Almost by definition, application of the cumulative
error rule requires argument of the very type of issues that counsel is
otherwise advised to discard in the issue selection process.
The Tenth Circuit explained the doctrine in United States v.
Rivera:222 "The cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless
errors has the potential to prejudice a defendant to the same extent as a
single reversible error. The purpose of a cumulative-error analysis is to
address that possibility., 223 The Colorado Supreme Court advanced a
similar explanation in Oaks v. People,224 in which the court reversed a
murder conviction despite convincing evidence of the accused's guilt.
225
In reversing, the court explained that the cumulation of technical, as op-
posed to substantial, errors at trial might warrant reversal even though
the technical errors would not individually justify relief from the convic-
226tion. This may be a particularly important consideration in a close
227case, according to the Oaks court, suggesting that counsel should al-
ways consider arguing cumulative error claims when a strong challenge
can be made to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the judgment.
Although the principle espoused in Oaks may seem dated,228 Colorado
still recognizes the doctrine of cumulative error and presumably, in the
proper case, the accumulation of non-reversible errors will still warrant
reversal.
229
Because the doctrine of cumulative error is designed to encompass
harmless error, counsel's determination of harmlessness does not fore-
close argument of the issue, although an attempt to include frivolous
issues or issues not demonstrating error will undoubtedly, in this in-
stance, jeopardize the credibility of the cumulative error claim.23°
221. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983).
222. 900 F.2d 1462, 1469-71 (10th Cir. 1990).
223. Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1469, relying on United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1988) and United States v. Canales, 744 F.2d 413, 430 (5th Cir. 1984).
224. 371 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1962).
225. Oaks, 371 P.2d at 445.
226. Id. at 446.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 451.
The Machiavellian doctrine-that the end justifies the means-is stranger to, and wholly
uncongenial with, our constitutional and common-law concepts. A wrong means to
achieve a deserved result finds no sanction in our law; only a right means affecting a
proper end finds justification in law. These are fundamental precepts which we affirm.
Id. at 446; cf. Burton v. Dormire, 295 F.3d 839, 849 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting substantial evidence
offered in support of death row petitioner's claim of actual innocence, but concluding that despite
being "trouble[d]" court must deny habeas relief because a showing of actual innocence does not
provide a basis for granting the writ under current law).
229. People v. Roy, 723 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Colo. 1986); People v. Caldwell, 43 P.3d 663, 673
(Colo. Ct. App. 2001); People v. Dore, 997 P.2d 1214, 1222-23 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
230. See Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1470.
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Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit has apparently rejected cumulative
error analysis, at least for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
raised in the context of habeas corpus.23' In Girtman v. Lockhart,232 the
court overruled prior authority relied on by the petitioner in asserting his
claim of cumulative ineffectiveness of counsel.233 This circuit split sug-
gests a potentially "cert-worthy" issue as to whether the Supreme Court's
seminal statement on Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance234 contem-
plates cumulative error analysis of counsel's multiple flaws or permits
lower courts to employ harm analysis in examining each claimed in-
stance of deficient performance individually.
With respect to other claims, the Eighth Circuit has applied a cumu-
lative error approach to the prejudice determination. Thus, when allega-
tions of prosecutorial misconduct have been asserted on direct appeal,
the court has looked to the "cumulative effect of such misconduct" in
235considering whether to reverse. And it also appears that the circuit has
implicitly recognized the viability of cumulative error analysis in civil
236 237appeals, as well.236 In Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., the court addressed
an issue relating to allegedly improper admission of testimony concern-
ing availability of collateral sources for recovery.238 The court reviewed
the claims and concluded, "We recognize that, under South Dakota law,
the introduction of workers' compensation into a trial constitutes error.
Here, however, the three areas of testimony complained of simply do not
rise to the requisite level, individually or cumulatively. The breaches
were slight, in not downright obscure.
' 239
Arkansas practice appears to parallel that in the Eighth Circuit. The
state courts do not consider ineffective assistance claims cumulatively,
24°
but a criminal appellant may otherwise advance a cumulative error claim
on direct appeal. 24' The Arkansas Supreme Court reiterated its preserva-
tion rule for presentation of cumulative error claims not involving inef-
231. See Girtman v. Lockhart, 942 F.2d 468,475 (8th Cir. 1991).
232. 942 F.2d 468.
233. Id. at 475 ("cumulative error does not call for habeas relief, as each habeas claim must
stand or fall on its own" (quoting Scott v. Jones, 915 F.2d 1188, 1198 (8th Cir. 1990))).
234. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
235. United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1992); accord United States v.
Wadlington, 233 F.3d 1067, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Benitez-Meraz, 161 F.3d 1163,
1166 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that counsel argued that each error warranted reversal individually, and
cumulatively).
236. See Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377,379 (8th Cir. 1993).
237. 981 F.2d 377.
238. Id. at 382.
239. Id. (citation omitted, emphasis added).
240. State v. Hardin, 60 S.W.3d 397, 399-400 (Ark. 2001).
241. See Noel v. State, 960 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Ark. 1998), affd denial of post conviction relief,
26 S.W.3d 123 (Ark. 2000), and habeus corpus denied, Noel v. Norris, 194 F. Supp. 2d 893 (E.D.
Ark. 2002).
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fective assistance in the capital appeal in Noel v. State.242 The defense
must preserve error by objecting to each instance of error at trial, make a
separate cumulative error claim to the trial court, and obtain a ruling on
that claim. 243 In Noel's case, the defense also moved for mistrial on each
individual error and then preserved the cumulative error claim in the
motion for directed verdict that was properly renewed at the close of all
evidence. 244 Having obtained rulings on both motions, the court held the
cumulative error claim was properly preserved for appellate review.
245
Arkansas courts also recognize cumulative error claims raised in the
context of civil appeals. 246 In Edwards v. Stills, 247 the Arkansas Supreme
Court concluded that the appellant had failed to preserve her cumulative
error complaint because no cumulative error motion had been made to
the trial court for ruling.248 The court, however, did consider the individ-
ual claims of error that had been properly preserved.249
Noel and Edwards demonstrate the significance of preservation of
error for purposes of appellate review. Trial counsel's failure to recog-
nize and raise a claim of cumulative error forecloses appellate review in
250Arkansas state courts, a strong argument for communication between
trial and appellate counsel during the course of proceedings in the trial
court.
E. Obtaining directions for the trial court on remand
Often, an important reason for including issues in the appeal that
might otherwise be unnecessary for success in the case lies in the need to
assure that retrial will not be marred by errors that previously occurred.
In this sense, inclusion of these issues is not designed to ask the appellate
court to rule prospectively, but in light of the record before it, to ensure a
fair trial on remand.
For example, in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Arkansas Sheriffs
Boys' Ranch,25' the Arkansas Supreme Court ordered remand on reversal
and proceeded to consider "the other points which are raised on this appeal
and will likely arise again upon retrial. 252 Further, the Arkansas Court of
242. 960 S.W.2d at 442-43.
243. Id. at 442.
244. Id. at 442-43.
245. Id.
246. See Edwards v. Stills, 984 S.W.2d 366, 389 (Ark. 1998).
247. 984 S.W.2d 366.
248. Id. at 389.
249. Id.
250. See Noel, 960 S.W.2d at 442; Edwards, 984 S.W.2d at 389.
251. 655 S.W.2d 389 (Ark. 1983).
252. Mo. Pac. RR. Co., 655 S.W.2d at 392.
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Appeals acted similarly in Jorden v. Arkansas Department of Human Ser-
vices:
253
Consequently, it is not necessary to address the remaining issues
raised by appellant except to the extent that such issues are likely to
arise in the retrial of this case. The only issue that we anticipate is
likely to arise again involves appellant's objection to hearsay testi-
mony by the attorney ad litem in the case. With respect to that issue
we simply remind the trial court that "[u]nless otherwise indicated,
the Arkansas Rules of Evidence shall apply" to juvenile proceed-
ings.
2 54
Similarly, in In re Casias,255 the Colorado Court of Appeals in-
structed the trial court in a divorce proceeding to make specific findings
regarding factors forming the basis for division of property, 256 particu-
larly with respect to the division of a 401(k) retirement account. 57 At
other times, reversing courts expressly decline to address other issues not
essential to the disposition of the case on appeal.258
F. The value of identification of error made by the trial court
In addition to those situations in which counsel should consider
inclusion of issues arguably meriting reversal, there are at least three
policy considerations that may dictate inclusion of issues in the appellate
brief for which there is no reasonable prospect for reversal. These are
claims that proponents of the conventional wisdom would certainly argue
should be excluded from the brief, yet there are sound reasons for inclu-
sion in special circumstances.
First, even when error does not merit reversal, the identification of er-
ror committed at trial by a trial court may prove important for a number of
reasons. Whether in terms of abuse of discretion in the admission or exclu-
sion of evidence, or in control of the trial process, or error that occurs in the
interpretation and application of law, trial court error warrants correction in
order to avoid future error on the part of the trial judge. The education of
the trial judge is often an important part of the appellate process. For exam-
ple, in People v. Horrocks,259 the Colorado Supreme Court considered the
use of hypothetical questions propounded to a psychologist through which
defense counsel sought to elicit potential explanations as to why the ac-
253. 38 S.W.3d 914 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001).
254. Jorden, 38 S.W.3d at 916 (citation omitted).
255. 962 P.2d 999 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
256. In re Casias, 962 P.2d at 1003.
257. Id. at 1002.
258. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 43 P.3d 1042, 1044 (N.M. 2002) ("Because we reverse
Defendant's sentence on the basis of the trial court's failure to adequately advise him of his right to
be sentenced by a jury, we do not address any additional alleged errors.").
259. 549 P.2d 400 (Colo. 1976) (en banc).
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cused attempted to flee following a shooting claimed to have been done in
self-defense. 260 The victim had apparently attempted to withdraw from the
confrontation after the defendant fired a warning shot, but the defendant
fired again, killing the victim.261 While affirming its commitment to the
abuse of discretion standard, the court observed that the question posed was
"comprehensive enough for the expert witness to formulate a rational opin-
ion, and the court was overly restrictive in excluding it."'262 Nevertheless,
the trial court's error in precluding use of the question was deemed harm-
less. 263
The trial court in Horrocks had rejected the hypothetical question as
failing to include all material facts in the case, but the Colorado Supreme
Court pointed out that the trial court had not indicated in the record what
material facts had been omitted that justified its conclusion that the question
was objectionable. 264 The defendant was afforded relief on an alternate
ground;265 the trial court was educated on the propriety of developing de-
fensive evidence through hypothetical questions propounded to experts.
Second, for institutional clients likely to have continuing litigation in-
volving the same substantive issue or procedural claim, identification of
error may well serve to avoid commission of a similar error in the next
case. This is particularly true when a trial court demonstrates hostility to-
ward a class of claims, clients, or particular attorneys. One of the important
functions of appellate courts lies in the supervision of the trial courts, a
function often compromised by application of the abuse of discretion doc-
trine.266 For example, in People v. Reaud,2 67 the Colorado Court of Appeals
held that a trial court's restrictions on voir dire incorporated in its written
"rules for jury selection," while not demonstrating an abuse of discretion
requiring reversal on the facts of the case, improperly compromised coun-
268sel's right to voir dire prospective jurors. Although the defendant gained
no relief,269 the disposition on appeal likely served to prevent reoccurrence
of the trial court's improper restriction on voir dire in subsequent trials.
260. Horrocks, 549 P.2d at 401.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 403.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 402.
265. Id. at 403-04. The court agreed with the defendant that a statutory ambiguity rendered his
conviction for "reckless manslaughter" unfair because the language of the statutory provision
essentially duplicated that defining criminally negligent homicide. Id. The court reduced the offense
to the lesser crime and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 404.
266. For a discussion of the concept of "discretion," see Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review:
Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCEss 47, 48-61 (2000).
267. 821 P.2d 870 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
268. Reaud, 821 P.2d at 872 ("[T]he particular restriction to which objection was made was
improper.").
269. Id.
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Third, appellate counsel may need to raise issues designed to educate
an appellate court about a particular pattern of misconduct on the part of
trial counsel. For instance, prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument
may not warrant relief in the individual case, but repeated misconduct may
ultimately lead to corrective measures being taken directly by appellate
courts or trial courts acting on the directive of appellate courts.270 One study
of such misconduct noted the tendency of appellate courts to eventually
apply sanctions or order reversal after repeated instances of misconduct
were brought to their attention.27 Repeated misconduct by a single prose-
cutor or by a prosecutor's office may eventually require intervention by the
trial or appellate courts.272
People v. Rodriguez273 provides an example of prosecutorial miscon-
duct meriting appellate review. On direct appeal, the Colorado Supreme
Court addressed the defendant's claims that the prosecutor engaged in
twenty-three separate instances of misconduct in closing argument, even
though there were numerous instances in which no contemporaneous objec-
tion had been made by trial counsel.274 While the court did not reverse, the
court did hold that misconduct not requiring reversal had occurred with
respect to some of the claims .275 For example, the court concluded that the
prosecutor's suggestion that the General Assembly had determined that the
death penalty was appropriate for Rodriguez did not lead to a literal inter-
pretation by jurors; however, the court expressly discouraged this line of
276argument. The court then concluded that the prosecutor committed mis-
conduct not warranting reversal in improperly suggesting his evaluation of
the case as one of the "worst., 277 The court also condemned the prosecu-
tor's explicit argument that "it is cheaper to execute a defendant than to
keep him or her in prison for the rest of their life. '278 While none of the
arguments found improper by the majority warranted relief, the court's
decision offers important guidance for the conduct of capital trials in the
future.
270. See Paul Spiegelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of Intent
in Appellate Review, I J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 115, 169-83 (1999).
271. See id. at 169-71.
272. Id. at 171-83 (reviewing history of misconduct claims in the First Circuit coming from the
United States Attorney's Office for the District of Puerto Rico).
273. 794 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1055 (1991), post conviction relief
granted, 914 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1996), habeus corpus denied, Rodriguez v. Zavaras, 42 F. Supp. 2d
1059 (D. Colo. 1999).
274. Rodriguez, 794 P.2d at 972.
275. Id. at 979.
276. Id. at 977.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 979.
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G. Answering important questions of law not requiring reversal
The identification of error by the appellate court may be important
for the development of the law generally, even though the individual
litigant does not benefit from the appellate court's determination. For
example, in State v. Sinyard,279 the New Mexico Court of Appeals ruled
on an issue of first impression-whether sentencing error could be raised
as a matter of fundamental error.28° Often, appellant counsel are called
upon to assert claims not preserved by trial counsel, and the designation
of such matters as fundamental claims addresses the lack of preservation
problem. While Sinyard gained no relief from his sentence, 281 the court's
opinion represented a small development in New Mexico law of impor-
tance to counsel handling criminal appeals.
In the post-conviction litigation in People v. Rodriguez, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court considered 319 claims attacking the conviction and
sentence of death.282 The court refused to grant relief, but did find that
one of the petitioner's convictions, for first-degree sexual assault, had to
be vacated based on an incorrect jury instruction that permitted convic-
tion on less than the statutorily required evidence.
283
Similarly, in People v. Stewart,284 the Colorado Supreme Court re-
viewed a reversal ordered by the Colorado Court of Appeals 285 in a case
involving a conviction for reckless assault with a deadly weapon.28' The
court of appeals reversed the conviction, which specifically involved the
defendant's use of his automobile to seriously injure another person.287
One of the issues addressed by the intermediate court concerned the ad-
mission of testimony by an investigating officer as "expert testimony"
requiring qualification.288 It dealt with the issue based on its view that the
28evidence would likely be offered again at the retrial. 89 In reversing the
court of appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court also addressed the admis-
sibility of expert opinion offered through an investigating police offi-
cer. 29 The court engaged in an analysis of decisions from other jurisdic-
tions on point2 91 after generally reviewing Colorado evidentiary rules
279. 675 P.2d 426 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
280. See Sinyard, 675 P.2d at 427.
281. Id.
282. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d at 247.
283. id. at 272-73.
284. 55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002).
285. See People v. Stewart, 26 P.3d 17 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
286. Stewart, 55 P.3d at 112.
287. Stewart, 26 P.3d at 19-20.
288. Id. at 25-26.
289. Id.
290. Stewart, 55 P.3d at 121-25.
291. Id. at 123-24.
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governing admissibility of lay292 and expert opinions.293 Ultimately, the
court concluded that officers testifying based on specialized training or
education must be properly qualified as experts prior to offering what
"amounts to expert testimony.,,294 But the court declined to find that the
error in admitting the testimony prejudiced the accused and thus af-
firmed.2 95
The Stewart litigation answered an important and continuing ques-
tion in Colorado criminal trials involving the proper use of police officer
expertise. While the disposition ultimately did not favor the accused,296
the decisions of the court of appeals and supreme court clarified the issue
for future litigants. Of course, it raised other issues as well, particularly
regarding the likelihood that the training afforded an officer is sufficient
to permit their qualification as an expert.297 Thus, while Stewart lost his
reversal in the court of appeals on the State's petition to the supreme
court, prosecutors now will be required to qualify their officer witnesses
as experts before developing their opinions in the guise of lay testi-
mony.
298
An analogous situation is sometimes presented in the appeal by the
prosecution on a point of law following the acquittal of the defendant.
For instance, after the defendant's acquittal on the defense of insanity,
the prosecution sought a clarification of Idaho law in State v. White.29
The prosecution was concerned that the trial court had improperly ex-
panded upon state law in instructing the jury on volitional insanity, or the
"irresistible impulse" test for insanity. 300 The Idaho Supreme Court took
the opportunity to announce its adoption of the ALI Model Penal Code
301
test for insanity, which includes a volitional component.3 °2 Relying on
state procedure permitting appeals by the prosecution even after acquit-
tal, the State obtained an advisory opinion clarifying a controlling rule of
law in Idaho criminal trials.303
292. COLO. R. EvlD. 701.
293. COLO. R. EviD. 702.
294. Stewart, 55 P.3d at 124.
295. Id. (pointing to Rule 35(e) of the Colorado Appellate Rules, which provides that error is
not reversible unless it prejudices a substantial right of the party suffering an adverse ruling).
296. Id. at 112.
297. Id. at 123-24.
298. Id. at 123 n.10.
299. 456 P.2d 797, 799 (Idaho 1969).
300. See White, 456 P.2d at 801-02.
301. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Official Draft 1962).
302. White, 456 P.2d at 802-03.
303. See IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2804(5), 19-2808 (repealed 1977). Such appeals are now
authorized by Rule 1 1(c)(9) of the Idaho Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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H. Reinforcing the client and trial counsel's confidence in appellate
counsel
Finally, the identification of error in the appellate court may en-
hance the relationship between appellate counsel and trial counsel when
different lawyers have represented the party at different stages of the
proceedings. If trial counsel is rightly concerned that the trial court has
erred, determination on appeal that the error in fact occurred, but was not
sufficient to warrant relief, may serve a number of purposes. It may reas-
sure counsel's perception of the proper disposition of the claim or motion
at trial. It may also serve to dispel any perception that appellate counsel
failed to acknowledge trial counsel's legitimate concern that the trial
court acted improperly. Moreover, it may reinforce the perception of
appellate counsel as a competent attorney in arguing the case on appeal,
perhaps ensuring repeat business from the trial attorney or client.
Often, clients believe that they have been treated unfairly in the trial
courts, and later, on appeal. Not infrequently, they are. The client's le-
gitimate interest in retaining faith that counsel has not compromised the
client's interests in the course of representation may, in such cases, be
paramount to reinforcing the attorney/client relationship. 304 In these
situations, counsel may well need to advance an argument at trial, or on
appeal, even knowing that the disposition will be unfavorable to the cli-
ent, if only to demonstrate loyalty to the client's position. °5 But counsel
304. Justice Brennan noted this problem in the context of representation of criminal defendants
in appointed appeals in his dissenting opinion in Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1983).
305. The author's experience in a recent case illustrates the point. In Buckley v. State, 76
S.W.3d 825 (Ark. 2002) [hereinafter Buckley II], the defendant, Buckley, insisted that trial counsel
object to empanelling a new jury for resentencing after his case had initially been reversed for
sentencing error in a prior appeal, see Buckley v. State, 20 S.W.3d 331, 337-39 (Ark. 2000). See
Buckley II, 76 S.W.3d at 829. When trial counsel refused to assert the claim, Buckley stated the
objection to the trial court personally, relying on a prior holding of the Eighth Circuit in which that
court had concluded that Arkansas did not recognize a process for empanelling a sentencing jury
after reversal for sentencing error, see Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375, 381 n.17 (8th Cir. 1991).
See Buckley 1H, 765 S.W.3d at 830. Trial counsel, however, concluded that Arkansas practice had
been altered by legislation establishing bifurcation of the trial process. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
97-101 (Michie 2001). Further, while no Arkansas decision had expressly upheld the practice of
limited remand before a jury charged solely on the issue of punishment, that conclusion was clearly
foreshadowed by the Arkansas Supreme Court's holding in Hill v. State, 887 S.W.2d 275 (Ark.
1994), in which the parties had apparently proceeded by agreement to sentencing by a jury upon a
plea of guilty, despite the absence of any statutory language authorizing this process. Hill, 887
S.W.2d at 277; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101(5) (Michie 2001) (authorizing parties to waive
jury sentencing after verdict of guilty returned by jury). The Buckley II court inferred from the
change in sentencing procedure that the State now has a right to demand jury sentencing upon
remand for resentencing when the appellate court finds reversible error in the punishment phase of
the bifurcated trial. Buckley 11, 76 S.W.3d at 830.
Buckley's disagreement with counsel over raising the jury resentencing issue resulted in a
change of counsel for purposes of his appeal following his resentencing. On appeal, however,
Buckley's insistence that the issue be asserted was respected, even though the outcome appeared
clear to counsel. See id. at 829-31. The client's argument was certainly not frivolous and the opinion
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is cautioned that appellate courts occasionally display hostility to aggres-
sive litigation tactics.
An experienced appellate attorney was recently disciplined by the
Indiana Supreme Court for remarks made in his brief seeking to transfer
the appeal from the court of appeals to the state supreme Court.306 His
complaint was that the decision of the intermediate court suggested to
him that the court's decision-making was outcome driven and intellectu-
ally dishonest. 30 7 Following a disciplinary proceeding, the supreme court
ordered him suspended from practice for a period of one month,30 8 hav-
ing previously ordered his brief supporting transfer to that court stricken.
In its earlier action, the court had characterized the brief as a "scurrilous
and intemperate attack on the integrity of the Court of Appeals. 3 °9
The Indiana Supreme Court decision imposing the suspension came
on a 3-2 vote.310 Ironically, one of the judges voting to impose the sanc-
tion had served on the court of appeals, concurring in the result without
opinion.311 The sanctioned lawyer undoubtedly has earned his client's
belief that his loyalty has not been compromised. Of course, his effec-
tiveness on the client's behalf likely has been jeopardized.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The ethical rules direct counsel to "abide by the client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation" and to "consult with the
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. 3 12 The thrust of
this directive makes excellent sense in terms of solidifying the attor-
ney/client relationship. Ironically, the concern appears to have been lost
on the Jones v. Barnes majority, which relegated control of the appeal to
counsel.3 13 Moreover, the Supreme Court's reliance on counsel's deci-
sion-making expertise seems somewhat peculiar in light of persistent
in Buckley H stands as authority for jury sentencing on remand in the discretion of the prosecution,
even over the objection of the defendant. See id. at 830-31.
306. In re Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d 714, 716-17 (Ind. 2002).
307. In the transfer petition, counsel stated:
The Court of Appeals' published opinion in this case is quite disturbing. It is replete with
misstatements of material facts, it misapplies controlling case law, and it does not even
bother to discuss relevant cases that are directly on point. Clearly, such a decision should
be reviewed by this Court. Not only does it work an injustice on appellant Michigan
Mutual Insurance Company, it establishes dangerous precedent in several areas of the
law. This will undoubtedly create additional problems in future cases.
Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d at 715. The attack was directed at the opinion issued in Michigan Mutual
Insurance Company v. Sports, Inc., 698 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
308. Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d at 719.
309. Mich. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sports, Inc., 706 N.E.2d 555, 555 (Ind. 1999).
310. Mich. Mutual, 706 N.E.2d at 555.
311. Mich. Mutual, 698 N.E.2d at 845; see Gary Young, Footnote Gets a Lawyer Suspended,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 13, 2002.
312. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1999).
313. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983).
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complaints from appellate judges about the quality of representation by
lawyers practicing in their courts.
The motivation of proponents of the conventional wisdom should
also be challenged. Clearly, appellate judges and their law clerks must be
justly concerned about workloads. Overload in the judicial system is
likely to compromise the quality of decision-making and opinion writing.
Nevertheless, the explicit suggestion that fairness in disposition of pend-
ing appeals may be compromised by inclusion of colorable claims hardly
promotes confidence in the appellate process. Appellate strategy should
be dictated by reasonable considerations of accuracy and faithful adher-
ence to precedent and principles of sound argument and logic, not by fear
of page length and sanctions.
If the quality of appellate practice is truly compromised by the vol-
ume of work reaching the courts, it may be that remedial measures
should be considered. One obvious solution lies in the creation of more
314judgeships and filling current vacancies. Another may lie in the certifi-
cation of appellate specialists whose training and experience will ensure
a better product for the consideration of appellate courts." 5 What is true,
regardless of the measures taken, is that the quality of appellate decision-
making is, to some extent, dependent on the quality of appellate repre-
sentation. The quality of representation should not be compromised by
limitations on briefing that fail to recognize the incredible expansion of
legal doctrine, judicial opinions, and statutory provisions that may be
brought to bear on the argument and disposition of any single issue in an
appeal. The solution to mounting caseloads that looks to counsel to limit
the number of claims presented for review is simply shortsighted and
unfair. It threatens counsel's exercise of professional judgment by prom-
ising better decision-making based on the proposition that advancing
fewer claims will result in the appellate court giving better review to
those fewer claims presented. This can hardly be the solution that pro-
motes the highest quality of practice that judges and practitioners advo-
cate.
314. See, e.g., William M. Richman, An Argument on the Record for More Federal Judgeships,
I J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 37 (1999).
315. See Elliot L. Bien, Toward a Community of Professionalism, 3 J. APp. PRAC. & PROCESS
475 (2001).

